Tunneling Based Solution to Bypass Internet Access Denial by International Internet Service Providers by MOHAMMED ABDUL, KHADIR KHAN ASIF

 
Dedicated to
My Beloved Parents and Brothers
iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious and the Most
Merciful
All praise and glory are due to Almighty Allah (SWT), to Him belongs the
sovereignty of the heavens and the earth. I am grateful to Allah for all His favours
on me since my birth, these blessings are indeed innumerable, and the greatest of His
bounties on me is being a Muslim. Peace and blessings of Allah be upon the noblest
of mankind, Muhammad (Peace Be upon Him), his household, his companions and
the generality of the true believers to the last day.
I would like to thank my beloved parents, beloved grandparents, aunties, uncles, my
brothers, cousins and all my family members for their moral support throughout my
academic career. I would never have been able to pursue this without their prayers,
cooperation, understanding, patience, guidance, and support.
I would like to express my profound gratitude and appreciation to my thesis com-
mittee chairman Dr. Marwan H. Abu-Amara for his support, intellectual guidance,
suggestions, advice, and readiness to assist during this research. His extensive knowl-
edge, patience, and experience made it possible to shape the thesis. He was always
available when I needed him and he answered all my questions, at any time of the
day. My deepest appreciation goes to my thesis committee co-chairman Dr. Mo-
hammed Houssaini Sqalli for his support, guidance, suggestions, and advice. I am
iv
extremely grateful to him for his prompt replies and his encouragement and having
trust in me. I would like to extend my deepest appreciation to my thesis committee
members Dr. Ashraf S. Hasan Mahmoud , Dr. Farag Ahmed Azzedin , and Profes-
sor Radwan Abdel-Aal for their interest, invaluable cooperation and support. Their
continuous support, advice and encouragement can never be forgotten.
I would like to acknowledge the support and facilities provided by King Fahd Univer-
sity of Petroleum and Minerals. I would like also to acknowledge the staff members
for their kind support and continuous cooperation. Moreover, I would like to express
my deepest thanks to every instructor who contributed in building my knowledge
and experience. Thanks are also due to faculty and staff members of the Computer
Engineering Department for their cooperation.
Finally, I render my profound acknowledgements to my project team members Al-
baiz, Alrefai, Fahd, and Khaled for the countless hours that we spent on discussing
and proposing solutions for the problems that we faced. Acknowledgements are
due to my friends and colleagues who made my stay at the university a precious
and an unforgettable era. I would like to make special thanks to my brother Mo-
hammed Abdul Waheed Khan and my friends Kareem bhai, Rizwan bhai, Waseem
bhai, Muqtadir bhai, Fareed bhai, Saad bhai, Zahid bhai, Sujahat bhai, Sarfaraz
bhai, Khalil, Nasar, Faizan, Malik, Nayeem, Eesaah, Junaid, Moiz, Ansar, Musheer,
Irfan, Minhaj, Suli, Aqeel, Touseef, and Zubair. Last but not least I would like to
thank everybody who contributed to this achievement in a direct or an indirect way.
v
Contents
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iv
LIST OF TABLES xi
LIST OF FIGURES xii
ABSTRACT (ENGLISH) xvii
ABSTRACT (ARABIC) xviii
Chapter 1 1
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Internet Denial By Service Providers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Research Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Problem Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4 Thesis Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.5 Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
vi
1.6 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.7 Limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.8 Organization of Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Chapter 2 11
2 Background 11
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3 Tunneling Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Chapter 3 16
3 Literature Survey 16
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.1.1 BGP Security Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.1.2 Tunneling Protocols and Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.1.3 Tunneling Techniques and Internet Resiliency . . . . . . . . . 24
Chapter 4 26
4 Tunnel Based Solution to Internet Access Denial 26
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.2 Solution to Internet Access Denial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
vii
4.2.1 Traffic Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.2.2 Identity Hiding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.3 Qualitative Analysis and Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Chapter 5 32
5 Design, Implementation and Validation of Solution 32
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5.1.1 Initial Baseline Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.1.2 Devices Used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
5.1.3 Mapping Devices Usage to our problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5.2 Baseline Simulation Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5.3 Proposed Simulation Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
5.4 Scalability Issue of the Propose Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5.4.1 Extending Tunnel-Based Solution Design to Multiple Tunnels 46
5.4.2 Extending Tunnel-Based Solution Design to Multiple ASes . . 46
5.4.3 Tunnel-Based Solution Design and Load Balancing Using a
Pool of Public IP Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.4.4 Extending Tunnel-Based Solution Design with the Increase in
the Number of Users . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
viii
Chapter 6 60
6 Performance Evaluation of the Tunnel-Based Solution 60
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
6.2 Simulation Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
6.3 Tunnel Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
6.4 Performance Metrics and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
6.4.1 Simulation for End-to-End Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
6.4.2 Simulation of Traffic Overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
6.4.3 Simulation of Packet Drop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
6.5 Discussion and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
6.5.1 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
6.5.2 Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
6.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Chapter 7 88
7 Conclusion 88
7.1 Summary of the Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
7.2 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
Appendix A 91
A Route Redistribution Configuration 91
ix
A.1 Route Redistribution Configuration at RouterR5 . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Appendix B 93
B OPNET Snapshot for Buffer Usage and Traffic Drop 93
B.1 OPNET Snapshot for Buffer Usage and Traffic Drop at Router R5 on
Interface IF10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
BIBLIOGRAPHY 101
VITA 108
x
List of Tables
4.1 Comparison Between Different Approaches. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.1 Baseline Configuration Setup: IP Forwarding Table at Router R2. . . 39
5.2 Baseline Configuration Setup: IP Forwarding Table at Router R4. . . 39
5.3 Baseline Configuration Setup: IP Forwarding Table at Router R5. . . 40
5.4 Tunnel Configuration: IP Forwarding Table at Router R2. . . . . . . 44
5.5 Tunnel Configuration: IP Forwarding Table at Router R5. . . . . . . 44
5.6 Multiple ASes Tunnel Configuration: IP Forwarding Table at Router
R2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
5.7 Multiple ASes Tunnel Configuration: IP Forwarding Table at Router
R8. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
5.8 BGP Forwarding Table at Router R5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.9 Multiple ASes Tunnel Configuration: IP Forwarding Table at Router
R5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
xi
List of Figures
1.1 Normal behaviour of the Internet. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1 Experimental Network Setup: Initial Design of Tunnel-Based Solu-
tion with Single Tunnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
5.2 Baseline Configuration Setup: Incoming and Outgoing Traffic be-
tween R2 and R4 and between R2 and R3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.3 Tunnel Configuration on Router R2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5.4 Tunnel Configuration on Router R5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
5.5 IP Tunnel Traffic Received and Sent (bits per seconds) on Tunnel0 at
Router R2 and R5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5.6 Extended Design for Tunnel Based Solution Using Multiple Tunnels
and Multiple ASes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5.7 Tunnel-Based Solution Design for the Load Balancing . . . . . . . . . 56
5.8 Configuration for Number of workstation or Users . . . . . . . . . . . 57
xii
5.9 Incoming and Outgoing Traffic between R2 and R4 and between R2
and R3 When Number of Users or Workstations are Increase to 40 . . 58
5.10 IP Tunnel Traffic Received and Sent (bits per seconds) on Tunnel0
at Router R2 and R5 When Number of Users or Workstations are
Increase to 40 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
6.1 Percentage of Increase in End-to-End Delay (Sec) - FTP(TCP)- 50K 67
6.2 Percentage of Increase in End-to-End Delay (Sec) - FTP(TCP)- 100K 67
6.3 Absolute End-to-End Delay (Sec)- FTP(TCP)- 50K . . . . . . . . . 68
6.4 Absolute End-to-End Delay (Sec)- FTP(TCP)- 100K . . . . . . . . . 68
6.5 Absolute Increase in End-to-End Delay (Sec) - FTP(TCP)- 50K . . . 69
6.6 Absolute Increase in End-to-End Delay (Sec) - FTP(TCP)- 100K . . 69
6.7 Percentage of Increase in End-to-End Delay (Sec) - HTTP(TCP) . . 70
6.8 Absolute End-to-End Delay (Sec)- HTTP(TCP) . . . . . . . . . . . 70
6.9 Absolute Increase in End-to-End Delay (Sec) - HTTP(TCP) . . . . . 71
6.10 Absolute End-to-End Delay (Sec) - Video(UDP) . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
6.11 Absolute Increase in End-to-End Delay (Sec) - Video(UDP) . . . . . 73
6.12 Percentage of Increase in End-to-End Delay (Sec) - Video(UDP) . . 74
6.13 Percentage of Increase in Overhead - FTP(TCP)- (R5 to R4) -50K . 75
6.14 Percentage of Increase in Overhead - FTP(TCP)- (R5 to R4) -100K . 75
6.15 Absolute Throughput (bps) - FTP(TCP) - (R5 to R4))-50K . . . . . 76
xiii
6.16 Absolute Throughput (bps) - FTP(TCP) - (R5 to R4)-100K . . . . . 76
6.17 Absolute Overhead (bps) - FTP(TCP)-(R5 to R4)-50K . . . . . . . . 77
6.18 Absolute Overhead (bps) - FTP(TCP)-(R5 to R4)-100K . . . . . . . 77
6.19 Percentage of Increase in Overhead HTTP(TCP)-(R5 to R4) . . . . 79
6.20 Absolute Throughput - HTTP(TCP)-(R5 to R4) . . . . . . . . . . . 79
6.21 Absolute Overhead (bps) - HTTP(TCP)-(R5 to R4) . . . . . . . . . 80
6.22 Percentage of Increase in Overhead Video(UDP)-(R5 to R4) . . . . . 80
6.23 Absolute Throughput (bps)- Video(UDP)-(R5 to R4) . . . . . . . . . 81
6.24 Absolute Overhead (bps) - Video(UDP)-(R5 to R4) . . . . . . . . . . 81
6.25 Maximum Instantaneous Percentage of Traffic Drop (bps) . . . . . . 84
6.26 Maximum Instantaneous Percentage of Traffic Drop (pps) . . . . . . 84
6.27 Percentage of Average Traffic Drop (bps) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
6.28 Percentage of Average Traffic Drop (pps) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
A.1 Route Redistribution Configuration at Router R5 . . . . . . . . . . . 92
B.1 IP Interface Buffer Usage (Bytes) with IP-in-IP Tunnel and with No
Tunnel for FTP 50K file size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
B.2 IP Traffic Dropped (Packets) with IP-in-IP Tunnel and with No Tun-
nel for FTP 50K file size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
B.3 IP Interface Buffer Usage (Bytes) with GRE Tunnel and with No
Tunnel for FTP 50K file size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
xiv
B.4 IP Traffic Dropped (Packets) with GRE Tunnel and with No Tunnel
for FTP 50K file size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
B.5 IP Interface Buffer Usage (Bytes) with GRE CS Tunnel and with No
Tunnel for FTP 50K file size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
B.6 IP Traffic Dropped (Packets) with GRE CS Tunnel and with No
Tunnel for FTP 50K file size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
B.7 IP Interface Buffer Usage (Bytes) with IP-in-IP Tunnel and with No
Tunnel for FTP 100K file size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
B.8 IP Traffic Dropped (Packets) with IP-in-IP Tunnel and with No Tun-
nel for FTP 100K file size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
B.9 IP Interface Buffer Usage (Bytes) with GRE Tunnel and with No
Tunnel for FTP 100K file size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
B.10 IP Traffic Dropped (Packets) with GRE Tunnel and with No Tunnel
for FTP 100K file size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
B.11 Interface Buffer Usage (Bytes) with GRE CS Tunnel and with No
Tunnel for FTP 100K file size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
B.12 IP Traffic Dropped (Packets) with GRE CS Tunnel and with No
Tunnel for FTP 100K file size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
B.13 IP Interface Buffer Usage (Bytes) with IP-in-IP, GRE, and GRE CS
Tunnel and with No Tunnels for Video Conferencing . . . . . . . . . . 100
xv
B.14 IP Traffic Dropped (Packets) with IP-in-IP, GRE, and GRE CS Tun-
nel and with No Tunnels for Video Conferencing . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
xvi
THESIS ABSTRACT
Name: Mohammed Abdul Khadir Khan Asif
Title: Tunneling Based Solution to Bypass Internet Access Denial by
International Internet Service Providers
Major Field: COMPUTER ENGINEERING
Date of Degree: DECEMBER 2010
The objective of this thesis is to propose effective counter measures to address the
problem of the malicious act of denial of Internet access by International Internet
Service Providers (IISPs), and to increase the resilience of the Internet services.
Furthermore, the thesis is to address this specific problem at the routing level. The
proposed solution is dependent on the use of a tunneling protocol. The proposed
solution and the effect of tunneling on the problem solution is evaluated through
simulation experiments. For the simulation purpose the OPNET network simula-
tor was used. The performance of the proposed solution is evaluated in terms of
throughput, end-to-end delay, and packet drop. Both the proposed solution and the
simulation experiments followed the Internet standards as closely as possible.
MASTER OF SCIENCE DEGREE
King Fahd University of Petroleum & Minerals, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia
DECEMBER 2010
xvii
 



 
 	
 الاسم: محمد عبد القادر خان آصف
 
حل مشكلة الحرمان المتعمد من قبل مقدمي خدمات الإنترنت الدوليين 
 من الوصول إلى الإنترنت بإعتماد بروتوكول الإتصال النفقي
 عنــوان الرسالة :
 
 
 التخصص: ھندسة حاسب آلي
 
  :تاريخ الدرجة  ديسمبر0102 
  
 الحرمان مشكلة لمعالجة فعالة مضادة تدابير اقتراح ھو الرسالة ھذه من الرئيسي الھدف
) الإنترنت الدوليين خدمات مقدمي قبل من المتعمد



 الإنترنت، إلى لوصولمن ا( 
 المشكلة ھذه معالجة تم الأطروحة ھذه وفي. الإنترنت خدمات مرونة زيادة إلى بالإضافة
) التوجيه طبقة في


 

 بروتوكول استخدام على يعتمد المقترح والحل(. 
) النفقي الاتصال



 محاكاة خلال من المشكلة على وتأثيره الحل تقييم تم حيث(. ﬁﬀ
) شبكات محاكاة برنامج باستخدام والحل المشكلة
ﬃﬂ
 المقترح الحل أداء تقييم وتم(. 
 البيانات وعدد الطرفين، نھاية نبي للتأخير الزمنية الفترة وحساب الإنتاجية، نسبة حيث من
 المحاكاة وتجارب المقترح الحل من كل في العالمية الإنترنت معايير مراعاة وتم. المفقودة
  .الإمكان بقدر
  

 
%$ #"!
' &
)(
+*
. -,
+
/
0
 
.
1
0
 
"
*
$ #
.
2(
'
$ #"
3.
$ 65 $ #44!
'
7
8
65 $ #
0
,
$ #4"
9: 9
'
;)
< #!
7
= &
$ #4!
.
"
,-
+
 
A?@?>
B
DDDDDDDDC
E
G F
 
iiivx
Chapter 1
Introduction
The Internet has become one of the most important means for reachability and
communication with others. The number of people using the Internet in June 2010
exceeded 1.96 billion users which constitutes about one quarter of the entire pop-
ulation of the world [1]. The Internet is a huge network of hundreds of millions of
nodes that exchange information with each other. Because of the dynamic nature
and very large size of the network, routing of data within it takes place on two
hierarchical levels. At a lower level, a group of devices are controlled by a single
administrative autonomy that has a complete view of its own network and is respon-
sible for the routing of Internet traffic within its boundaries (intra-domain routing)
[2]. The network controlled by a single administrative autonomy is referred to as an
autonomous system (AS). At a higher level, routing between different ASes (inter-
domain routing) takes place by means of the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP).
1
2Due to the importance of the Internet, it is crucial to ensure the availability and the
resiliency of the Internet against all malicious and non-malicious activities. Accord-
ingly, the following subsections explore a specific type of malicious activities that
can affect the Internet availability at a large scale, clearly state the formal descrip-
tion of the problem, the objectives, the scope, the assumptions, and the limitations
of the research covered in the thesis.
1.1 Internet Denial By Service Providers
From a strategic point of view for any country such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
(KSA), improving the country’s Internet resilience including not having to rely on
a single International Internet Service Provider (IISP) for providing Internet con-
nectivity to the country is very important. The Internet resiliency can be impacted
by many causes including outages. The causes for the Internet unavailability or
outage can be categorized into either non-malicious or malicious including hardware
and/or software failures, denial of service attacks, terrorists’ attacks, and deliberate
denial of Internet access by IISPs. The initial literature review in the area of Inter-
net availability and resilience classified the Internet unavailability causes and found
that they occur at three levels: application, routing, and physical [3].
The current status of the literature indicates that the subject of deliberate denial
of Internet access by IISPs has not been researched, and no known commercial so-
3lutions are available to address the issue. Accordingly, an IISP can utilize BGP to
maliciously block routing information from and to a particular AS that the IISP is
serving. Further, the IISP can filter traffic to and from a specific AS. Therefore, the
thesis addresses the problem of intentional denial of Internet access by IISPs but
only at the routing level.
1.2 Research Motivation
The basic motivation for the research is to provide resilient Internet service to a local
region. In this study, we are considering KSA as a local region. Internet access de-
nial can be due to many reasons, such as a malicious IISP through the manipulation
of advertised routes to ASes served by the IISP. In general, any IISP can maliciously
block a certain region traffic from passing through. The blocking can happen on
either direction (i.e., incoming traffic to that region or outgoing traffic from that
region). Under such a case the local region becomes partially or completely isolated
from the rest of the Internet. The worst case scenario could happen if the Internet
access denial is caused by one or more tier-1 ISP which results in a complete Internet
isolation. Tier-1 ISPs are the core of the Internet that are responsible for transfering
large amounts of data, have international coverage, and are directly connected to
each other and to a large number of lower tier ISPs. The victim network can be
an entire region’s network, an enterprise network, or a single host depending on the
4location of the blocking IISP.
The term Malicious Service Provider (MSP) has been used in the literature to de-
scribe a malicious activity by a service provider to hijack Internet prefixes [4]. For
example, 106,089 prefixes were hijacked in December 2004 by AS 9121 [5]. Similarly,
prefix 64.233.161.0/24 which includes IP addresses for Google was hijacked in May
2005 by AS 174 [6]. Such incidents can expose sensitive traffic sent by users to the
hijacker, allowing the hijacker to drop, record, and/or modify the contents of the
intercepted traffic.
The concept of a malicious ISP is realistic even though IISPs are supposed to pro-
vide the promised service to their customers for fear of losing them, and, ultimately,
jeopardizing their reputations. However, there are many reasons that may force
an IISP to become malicious and perform an Internet access denial to a specific
region. For example, Internet access denial can be driven by political motivations,
as governments may attempt to establish an Internet embargo on a targeted region
by forcing ISPs to block Internet access to that specific region. Many large services
and networks have been attacked recently for political motivations. As an example,
on December 2009, Gmail had many attacks targeting email accounts of Chinese
human rights activists [7]. Similarly, Twitter has also been attacked during 2009 by
hackers from Iran [8]. Another prime example of political motivations of a service
provider to deny Internet access to an organization are the recent attempts by many
governments to pressure service providers to deny access to WikiLeaks [9]. Likewise,
5ISPs’ routers may be hacked by attackers and reconfigured to drop traffic, causing
Internet access denial.
It is possible that the Internet in KSA can become a victim of this type of problem,
especially that none of the IISP or higher tier ISP reside in KSA. These reasons, and
many others, can encourage IISPs to perform Internet access denial on a specific
region or country. The risk and impact of Internet access denial could be critical for
the government and many other organizations. Therefore, there is a need to study
this problem and how to deploy an effective solution. This thesis aims at proposing
a solution that can circumvent this particular problem at the routing level and study
the effect on the network performance.
1.3 Problem Description
The thesis addresses the problem of the unavailability of the Internet due to the
malicious act of denial of Internet access by the IISP. Furthermore, in the problem
considered, we address only the routing level of the problem of the denial of Internet
access.
To illustrate the problem further, Figure 1.1 provides a typical network configuration
that consists of four ASes. AS100 represents the local AS (e.g. AS for KSA), AS200
represents a neighbouring country AS, AS300 is the IISP and connects both AS100
and AS200 to other ASes in the Internet, and AS400 is a possible destination AS
6for AS100. Figure 1.1 represents the normal behaviour of the Internet without any
denial of Internet access by the IISP.
In the problem considered in this thesis, we assume that one IISP, AS300, provides
Figure 1.1: Normal behaviour of the Internet.
the service to the local AS, AS100. While the IISP denies the service to the local AS,
it still provides the service to other ASes such as AS200 and AS400. The problem is
then how to provide Internet services to the local AS, even after the IISP has denied
Internet access to the local AS.
71.4 Thesis Objectives
The main objective of the thesis is to propose a tunneling based solution to the
Internet unavailability due to the malicious act of denial of Internet access by IISPs
only at the routing level. Thus, the thesis will concentrate on the following:
1. Proposing a solution to the IISP blocking problem through tunneling. This
involves surveying different tunneling protocols, and choosing the most appro-
priate tunneling protocol for the solution.
2. Validating the proposed solution through simulations using OPNET [10].
3. Characterizing the network performance under different tunneling protocols
while considering the lack as well as the presence of encryption.
1.5 Scope
The thesis takes into account the following scope for the proposed solution:
1. Only a tunnel-based solution is considered whereby a tunnel is created with
the help of a neighbouring AS from the local AS to each destination AS. Note
that a tunnel is needed only if traffic destined to ASes passes through the
malicious IISP.
2. The proposed solution is tested and evaluated using different tunneling proto-
cols, and with and without encryption through simulation. For the simulation
8purpose, the network simulator OPNET is used [10].
3. While simulating the proposed solution we will follow the standards as closely
as possible.
1.6 Assumptions
In line with the scope of the proposed solution outlined in section 1.5, the following
assumptions are made:
1. Only one IISP serves the local AS, and is maliciously blocking the Internet
access only to that local AS.
2. The destination point of a tunnel is known apriori, and a service level agree-
ment with the destination ASes is already established.
3. Neighbouring ASes have service level agreements with the local AS so that a
tunnel can be easily created through the neighbouring ASes.
4. The IISP malicious blocking of the Internet access to the local AS is known
apriori.
91.7 Limitation
As OPNET [10] is used to simulate the proposed solution, only OPNET supported
tunneling protocols and encryption algorithms will be examined. More specifically,
the IPSec tunneling protocol was not considered as it is not supported by OPNET’s
Discrete Event Simulation (DES).
1.8 Organization of Thesis
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 starts with background
information about the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), as well as the different types
of tunnels. Chapter 3 proceeds with a literature survey related to our work. In
particular, we discuss the security issues related to BGP. Afterwards we look at the
different applications of tunneling protocols, and at the end of the chapter we look
at the tunneling techniques and Internet resiliency. Chapter 4 provides an overview
of different approaches to resolve the Internet access denial problem at the routing
level. Chapter 5 provides the baseline configuration of the network and followed by
the tunnel configuration of the network (i.e., the proposed solution). At the end of
the chapter, we look at the scalability issue to the proposed solution. Chapter 6
provides the performance evaluation of the proposed solution. This is then followed
by the discussion of the proposed solution in terms of connectivity and performance;
and the chapter is concluded by some recommendations. The thesis finally concludes
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in chapter 7, where we discuss the overall picture of the proposed solution and the
chapter is concluded by suggestions for the future work.
Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we briefly present the relevant background on BGP and different
types of tunneling protocols.
2.2 Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)
BGP is a de facto standard and is the only inter-AS routing protocol of the Internet.
BGP is a path vector routing protocol. BGP is used in tens of thousands of Internet
routers [11]. BGP views the Internet as a mesh of a number of ASes connected by
inter-domain (inter-AS) links. BGP is responsible for discovery and maintenance
of paths between distant ASes in the Internet. BGP exchanges information about
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how to reach the blocks of IP addresses. The block of IP addresses is referred to as
an IP prefix. BGP routers exchange routing information via UPDATE messages.
UPDATE messages can be classified into two types: route withdrawal and route
announcement. When a BGP router receives an UPDATE message from its neigh-
bouring BGP router, the message will be processed, stored, and redistributed in
accordance with BGP specification [11], and the routing policies of the local AS.
BGP provides reachability information to ASes and distributes external reachabil-
ity internally within an AS. When an AS advertises a route to the next AS through
an UPDATE message, it adds the Autonomous System Number (ASN) at the be-
ginning of the AS-PATH of the UPDATE message.
A router that communicates directly with other routers via BGP is known as a BGP
speaker. For complete Internet reachability, every AS must have at least one BGP
speaker that is connected to at least one other AS. BGP uses two main protocols;
Internal BGP (IBGP) and External BGP (EBGP). Note that IBGP is used inside
an AS and EBGP is used to exchange network reachability information between
ASes [11].
2.3 Tunneling Protocols
In networking, IP tunnels are often used to connect two disjoint IP networks. A
tunneling protocol uses a protocol to encapsulate a different protocol. By using
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tunneling, a payload can be carried over an incompatible delivery network, or over
a secure path through an untrusted network. Tunneling can be secured by using
data encryption to transport insecure payload protocols over a public network such
as the Internet, and hence creating a virtual private network (VPN). In the rest of
this section, we will discuss different types of tunneling protocols.
The IP in IP tunneling protocol is defined in RFC 1853 [12], and it discusses the
implementation techniques for using IP protocol/payload number 4 encapsulation
for tunneling with IPSec and other protocols. In IP-in-IP encapsulation, the IP
datagram is encapsulated by inserting an outer IP header before the original IP
header [13]. The “endpoints” of the tunnel are the Source Address and Destination
Address of the outer IP header. The inner IP header Source Address and Destina-
tion Address identify the original sender and recipient of the datagram respectively.
Other protocol headers such as the IP Authentication header may be inserted be-
tween the outer IP header and the inner IP header. Once the encapsulated datagram
arrives at the end of the tunnel destination node, it is decapsulated and the original
IP datagram is delivered to the destination indicated by the original destination
address field [13]. An encapsulated datagram is typically larger than the original
datagram.
Another example of a tunneling protocol that runs over the network layer is the
Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) protocol[14]. GRE is a protocol that runs
over IP, with RFC 1918 private addresses, over the Internet using delivery pack-
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ets with public IP addresses. In this case, the delivery and payload protocols are
compatible, but the payload addresses are incompatible with those of the delivery
network.
The Point to Point Protocol (PPP) [RFC 1661] defines an encapsulation mecha-
nism for transporting multiprotocol packets across Layer 2 (L2) point to point links.
Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP) extends the PPP model by allowing the L2 and
PPP endpoints to reside on different devices interconnected by a packet-switched
network. With L2TP, a user has an L2 connection to an access concentrator and
the concentrator then tunnels individual PPP frames to the Network Access Server
(NAS) [15].
The Point to Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP) can be used as a tunnel through an
IP network. PPTP does not provide confidentiality or encryption. It relies on the
protocol being tunneled to provide privacy. PPTP uses an enhanced GRE mecha-
nism to provide a flow and congestion controlled encapsulated datagram service for
carrying PPP packets [16].
Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) can be used for securing the tunnels. IPSec is
a standardized framework for securing IP communications in general by encrypt-
ing and/or authenticating each IP packet in a data stream. IPSec has two modes;
transport mode and tunneling mode. In transport mode, only the payload of the
IP packet is encrypted. It is fully-routable since the IP header is sent as plain text.
In tunnel mode, the entire IP packet is encapsulated within an IP packet to ensure
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that no part of the original packet is changed as it is moved through a network [17].
Chapter 3
Literature Survey
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we survey the literature related to our work. Initially, we discuss
some BGP security issues that are relevant to the problem considered in the thesis.
After that, we look at the tunneling protocols and their applications, followed by a
description of the tunneling techniques and the Internet resiliency.
3.1.1 BGP Security Issues
The major concern about BGP security is that malicious BGP routers can arbitrar-
ily falsify BGP routing messages and spread incorrect routing information [18]. As
stated earlier, BGP routers exchange routing information via UPDATE messages.
Incorrect UPDATES, due to either a BGP router misconfiguration or a malicious
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activity, may cause serious problems to routing in the Internet. For example, on
May 7, 2005, Google went down for less than an hour [19]. One speculation is that
DNS poisoning attacks caused this service outage because an AS falsely claimed to
originate Google’s prefix and some traffic sent to Google was redirected to other
websites. Google later denied that it was under any attack and clarified that to
their knowledge, their service outage was due to internal DNS misconfigurations
[19]. Similarly, in June 2006, several prefixes were hijacked by AS 23520 [20]. An-
other example occurred on April 25, 1997, where a small ISP incorrectly announced
all the prefixes learned from its upstream ISP as its own prefixes [21]. These faulty
routes spread to the rest of the Internet. As a result, most of the Internet traffic
is routed through the small ISP. The traffic overwhelmed the misconfigured and
intermediate routers, many routers were affected and even crashed, and the whole
Internet was unstable for hours.
As stated earlier, another serious concern about BGP is that BGP does not allow
an AS to control exactly how its traffic is routed to other destinations [22]. Thus,
Internet access denial can take place if the packets are routed by BGP through a
malicious ISP, and if the malicious ISP drops these packets. Hence, the Internet
access denial can be prevented by controlling the traffic path so that the traffic does
not pass through the malicious ISP, or by preventing the traffic from being dropped
at the malicious ISP by concealing the traffic identity.
A modification of BGP is needed at all routers in the Internet in order to control
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the traffic path so that traffic is not sent through the malicious ISP. Accordingly,
Quoitin et al. [23, 24] proposed BGP tuning techniques to influence the path se-
lection process of remote ASes. Alrefai [25] enhanced the BGP tuning techniques
proposed by Quoitin et al. to achieve better scalability results.
Zhang and Zhao [18] pointed out a new type of attack, namely selective dropping
attack that has not been studied before. A selective dropping attack occurs when
a malicious router intentionally drops incoming and outgoing UPDATE messages,
which results in data traffic being black-holed or trapped in a loop. The authors
conducted research through the analysis of this type of attack and advocated that
new security countermeasures should be developed to detect and prevent such an
attack. However, the authors did not present any technique to detect and prevent
such attacks.
The “Dropping” behavior discussed in [18] indicates that a router itself drops the
incoming or the outgoing UPDATE message. Dropping an incoming UPDATE mes-
sage means that when a router receives an incoming UPDATE message from a peer,
it stores the route information internally but does not apply this route information
to the route selection process. Similarly, dropping an outgoing UPDATE message
means that when a router selects a new route, it does not send the new route to
its peers. If the faulty/malicious router drops the incoming withdrawal or outgoing
withdrawal messages for a particular prefix, then a black-hole for that traffic may
be formed. If the router also drops incoming routes, either announcement or with-
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drawal, persistent packet forwarding loop can occur.
To address the selective dropping attacks in BGP, Chuah and Huang [26] proposed
a scheme called Instability Analysis with Neighbour Probing (IANP) for detecting
such attacks. In this scheme, an instability analysis will be triggered at an observa-
tion point, referred to as the monitor, when the number of received BGP UPDATES
within a burst exceeds a certain threshold. When the monitor cannot identify the
instability source, it will probe its neighbouring routers to see if they can identify
the source of instability. Once the source of instability is identified, the monitor
will check its stable route database to see if a selective dropping attack is embedded
within this burst of BGP UPDATES. If a monitor suspects that a BGP router is
conducting a selective dropping attack, then it will issue a warning message that
will be flooded, with limited scope, across the BGP routers in the Internet.
3.1.2 Tunneling Protocols and Applications
Tunneling techniques have been used in various applications. For example, VPN and
Mobile IP are the most widely known applications that use tunneling techniques.
VPN helps to inter-connect multiple locations belonging to one enterprise or belong-
ing to a group of related enterprises that are shared over a public network. A VPN
creates a virtual tunnel that connects two endpoints of the enterprise. Accordingly,
the VPN traffic sent over a public network is isolated from the rest of the traffic
carried by the public network [27]. The most popular VPN tunneling protocols
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available are L2TP, PPTP and IPSec [15, 16, 17]. On the other hand, Mobile IP is
designed to allow a mobile device to use a single permanent IP address even though
the mobile device has moved from one network to another network. In Mobile IP,
an extra IP address known as Care of Address (CoA) is assigned to the mobile de-
vice. It is used with a special purpose router known as the Home Agent (HA). The
HA then uses an IP-in-IP tunnel to forward packets sent by a correspondent to the
mobile device by using the mobile device assigned CoA [28].
Aqun et al. [29] provided a comparative study of various tunneling protocols such as
L2TP, GRE, IPSec, and IP-in-IP using different criteria such as working mode, se-
curity mechanism, tunnel management and maintenance, support for multiplexing,
support for multi-protocol, and Quality of Service (QoS). The paper concludes that
from a working mode perspective, L2TP works in a client/server mode, whereas the
other tunneling protocols work in a peer-to-peer mode. From security mechanism
perspective, IPSec provides a complete built in security mechanism, whereas L2TP
and GRE provide a weak security mechanism, and IP-in-IP provides no security
mechanism. From a tunnel management and maintenance perspective, IP-in-IP has
a soft state mechanism with no additional overhead since it relies on the Internet
Control Message Protocol (ICMP) existing in the IP network, whereas L2TP pro-
vides some tunnel management and maintenance features such as sending HELLO
messages periodically. On the other hand, IPSec and GRE are not considering the
management and maintenance problem. From the support for multiplexing perspec-
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tive, IP-in-IP does not support multiplexing, whereas the other tunneling protocols
support multiplexing. With respect to the support for multi-protocols, both GRE
and L2TP support multi-protocols, whereas IPSec and IP in IP do not support
multi-protocols. From the QoS perspective, none of the above tunneling protocols
provide support for QoS. The authors suggested that two tunneling protocols can
be integrated for better performance such as IP-in-IP and IPSec.
Tunnels can be created virtually at different layers of the OSI stack. Typically, it is
created either from the network layer or the data link layer. Saad et al. [30] discuss
the various implementation and technical details of layer 2 tunneling techniques,
such as L2TP, MPLS, etc.
In recent years, many researchers [31, 32, 33] have conducted research on the perfor-
mance evaluation of different VPN tunneling protocols based on different operating
systems. The most known VPN tunneling protocols are considered, namely PPTP,
L2TP, IPSec, and Secure Socket Layer (SSL). IPSec is an OSI layer 3 tunneling
protocol, whereas PPTP, L2TP, and SSL are OSI layer 2 tunneling protocols.
Joha et al. [31] considered the performance evaluation of remote access VPN by
using Windows XP SP2 as a VPN client and Windows server 2003 and Fedora Core
6 as VPN servers. In their research, performance evaluation is provided for three
commonly used VPN tunneling protocols, namely PPTP, L2TP/IPSec, and Open-
VPN. The throughput, Round-Trip Time (RTT), jitter, and packet loss are used
as performance metrics. The paper concludes that from the TCP throughput per-
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spective, the PPTP on Windows server 2003 performs the best, and OpenVpn on
Windows server 2003 performs the worst. On the other hand, the PPTP onWindows
server 2003, PPTP on Fedora Core 6, L2TP/IPSec on Windows server 2003, and
L2TP/IPSec on Fedora Core 6 have the highest UDP throughput. From the RTT
perspective, PPTP on Windows server 2003 performs the best, and L2TP/IPSec on
fedora core 6 performs the worst. Furthermore, the PPTP on Windows server 2003,
PPTP on Fedora Core 6, L2TP/IPSec on Windows server 2003, and L2TP/IPSec
on Fedora Core 6 have the lowest jitter and packet loss.
Narayan et al. [32, 33] evaluated the performance impact on different tunnel pro-
tocols and operating systems, as a result of using common encryption and data
integrity algorithms. The common encryption algorithms used are Triple Data En-
cryption Standard (3DES) and Blowfish (BF). On the other hand, the common data
integrity algorithms used are Message-Digest 5 (MD5) and Secure Hash Algorithm
(SHA1). It should be noted that PPTP was designed to use only Microsoft Point
to Point Encryption (MPPE).
Narayan et al. [32] provided the performance evaluation of VPN tunneling protocols
in Windows 2003 environment and they extended their work in [33] with additional
operating systems. The authors considered three operating systems (OS), Windows
Vista, Windows Server 2003, and Linux Fedora Core 6 with three commonly used
VPN tunneling protocols, namely IPSec, PPTP, and SSL. The authors also consid-
ered the use of different compatible encryption and integrity algorithms with the
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VPN tunneling protocols. The statistics collected are on the throughput, CPU uti-
lization, and initiation time as the performance of metrics. Throughput and CPU
utilization without VPN were found to be 95Mbps and 5%, respectively. The au-
thors concluded that when using Windows server 2003, the throughput of PPTP
MPPE provided the highest bandwidth, i.e., 90 Mbps, while SSL 3DES SHA1 pro-
vided the least bandwidth, i.e., 40 Mbps. Further, the paper concluded that IPSec
CPU usage is the least (i.e., between 5% and 12%) and SSL CPU usage is the most
(i.e., up to 42%). When considering Windows Vista, the authors concluded that
the throughput performance shows a similar pattern as Windows server 2003. How-
ever, the SSL average throughput is significantly lower than in Windows server 2003
(i.e., around 25Mbps). For the performance evaluation under Linux, the throughput
trend is slightly different than the other OSs. The paper concluded that the IPSec,
PPTP, and SSL throughput performance is not distinguishable. Further, the paper
concluded that all three OS perform similarly when comparing the no VPN case
to the PPTP case. However SSL values are distinctly different for each OS. Linux
is the best with an average of 80Mbps and Windows Vista is the worst with an
average of 20Mbps. From the CPU usage perspective, Linux consumes the highest
CPU usage on both the client and the server sides. On the other hand, Windows
server 2003 CPU usage is the least. From the initiation time perspective, Windows
OS VPN initiation time is lower than the Linux VPN initiation time. The initiation
time for Windows OS is below 0.6ms, and for Linux the range is 1ms to 1.7ms.
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Khanvilkar et al. [34] studied some of the most popular Open-Source Linux-Based
VPN solutions (OSLVs). In this research, they compared the network performance
in terms of overhead, bandwidth utilization, and latency/jitter. The paper concludes
that there is no single OSLV solution that considers all the aspects. They compared
the OSLVs using UDP based tunnels and TCP based tunnels, where UDP and TCP
based tunnels refer to the upper layer protocols that carry the tunnel traffic. UDP
based tunnels have 50 percent lower overhead, 80 percent higher utilization, and
40-60 percent lower latency/jitter.
3.1.3 Tunneling Techniques and Internet Resiliency
The tunneling techniques have been used to improve the Internet resiliency. For
example, to enhance the robustness of a network to dual link failures, Kini et al.
[35] developed a technique that combines the positive aspects of the various single-
link failure recovery techniques. In the proposed approach, every node is assigned
three protection addresses and one normal address. The network recovers from the
first failure using IP-in-IP tunneling using one of the protection addresses of the
next node in the path. Packets destined to the protection address of a node are
routed over a protection graph where the failed link is not present. Every protection
graph is guaranteed to be two-edge connected by construction and guaranteed to
tolerate a dual link failure.
Similarly, Wu et al. [36] consider a failure scenario that breaks an AS into two or
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more isolated parts and disrupt the connectivity among these AS partitions. The AS
partitions cannot communicate between themselves, unless their neighbors provide
extra connectivity to bypass the failure. Special configuration is needed, for example,
tunneling, to be set as the neighbors cannot use the AS number to distinguish the
partitions. The authors conclude that AS partitioning becomes equivalent to the
failure of an access link.
Chapter 4
Tunnel Based Solution to Internet
Access Denial
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we will consider an overview of the different approaches, includ-
ing the tunnel-based approach, to resolve the Internet access denial problem while
describing the advantages and the disadvantages to each approach.
4.2 Solution to Internet Access Denial
Different approaches can address the IISP blocking problem at the routing level.
Two classes of solutions can be considered. One of the classes of solutions is based
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on traffic control such that traffic does not pass through the malicious IISP. The
other class of solutions is based on identity hiding so that traffic does not get filtered
by the malicious IISP. These two classes of solutions are discussed in the following
subsections.
4.2.1 Traffic Control
This class of solutions depends on preventing the traffic from being sent to the ma-
licious IISP. To implement this solution, we need to manipulate the existing BGP
protocol to control incoming and outgoing traffic. Accordingly, the victim’s traffic
does not pass through the malicious IISP.
AlRefai [25] proposed a solution based on BGP tuning where in his approach the
blocking problem is solved by changing the Local Preference (Loc-Pref) of the local
AS so that the outgoing traffic is routed through non-malicious ASes. In addition,
in order to control the incoming traffic, AS-Path shortening that advertises more
specific prefixes or community techniques are considered. In the BGP tuning tech-
nique, the author is not relying on a single IISP and assumed that at least one
non-malicious IISP is available. The drawback of the solution is the dependance on
the existance of at least one addtional IISP beside the malicious IISP.
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4.2.2 Identity Hiding
This class of solutions has two types; one that uses Network Address Translation
(NAT) [37], and the other uses tunneling. The tunneling solution is proposed by
this thesis and will be discussed in details later.
Network Address Translation
In the NAT approach of identity hiding [37], IP addresses of the local AS are hidden
from the global Internet through the use of NAT routers. In this approach, NAT
uses non-blocked IP addresses as public IP addresses to hide the identity of all the
outgoing traffic. By the NAT technique, a small set of non-blocked IP addresses
allows a large amount of hosts to access the Internet. As suggested by the author,
multiple public IPs can be used to solve the scalability problem with the NAT
routers being deployed at the gateway-level of the network to hide the identity of
the traffic. The author concludes that from the performance point of view, the
NAT delay is negligible. The author also proposed techniques for HTTP and SMTP
servers’ reachability behind NAT. A drawback of this solution is that peer-to-peer
(P2P) applications require the use of a relay to function properly. However, the use
of a relay causes a major hit on the performance of the P2P applications.
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Tunnel-Based Solution
In the tunneling protocol approach of identity hiding, a tunnel is created from
the local AS to the destination AS. To implement this solution, we can utilize
available tunneling protocols like IPinIP, GRE, IPSec, etc. Before this type of
solution is implemented, we need the presence of cooperating ASes before and after
the malicious IISP. Afterwards, a tunnel needs to be created to each AS that is
a neighbour of the malicious IISP with the local AS. By doing so, the malicious
IISP can be bypassed. Once this solution is implemented, it is highly reliable. The
only case where the solution does not work is when the destination host is within
the malicious network. The scalability problem can be solved by creating multiple
tunnels at the gateway-level of the local AS. Since we have cooperating ASes present
after the malicious AS, we can utilize the existing tunnel to route the traffic to the
neighbours of the cooperating ASes. This will limit the number of tunnels at the
gateway-level at the local AS that need to be established. As there is no limit for
the number of tunnels, and since we are creating a large number of tunnels at the
gateway-level, this may degrade the performance of the router. To solve this issue we
can use multiple public IPs at the gateway-level and we can distribute the tunnels
on the gateway routers. The thesis focuses on identity hiding using a tunneling
protocol and the solution aims to provide high Internet availability.
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4.3 Qualitative Analysis and Comparison
In the Table 4.1 we provide a comparison between all the approaches considered
in this chapter in terms of the following criteria: traffic filtering, setup overhead,
communication overhead, difficulty to combat the method, malicious IISP services,
and scalability. In the following paragraphs each criteria is discussed.
Traffic filtering refers to the amount of the traffic filtered out using the approaches
Table 4.1: Comparison Between Different Approaches.
BGP Tuning NAT-Based Solution Tunnel-Based Solution
Filtering the traffic Small No No
Setup overhead Small High High
Communication overhead No High Medium
Difficulty to combat the method Easy Difficult Difficult
Malicious IISP services No Yes No
Scalability High High High
discussed earlier. The methods that leads to no filtering of traffic are tunnel-based
and NAT-based approaches, as both approaches use IP addresses that do not belong
to the prefix that the malicious IISP has blocked. In both cases, the local region
AS identity is hidden to the malicious IISP. On the other hand, the BGP tuning
approach traffic will experience filtering if the traffic passes through the malicious
IISP.
Setup overhead refers to the amount of the time needed to get all the required
configurations in place to execute the approach. The setup overhead is high in the
tunnel-based approach when compared to the BGP tuning approach. In the NAT
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based approach the setup overhead is high when the applications servers are behind
NATs.
The communication overhead refers to the number of routing messages that need
to be exchanged between the local region AS gateway routers before the method is
effective. In the BGP tuning approach, no communication overhead is required, and
the NAT-based approach required a high amount of overhead when both NATing
and relaying used to facilitate peer-to-peer communication. On the other hand
the tunnel-based solution requires medium communication overhead for establishing
tunnels.
The difficulty to combat the method refers to the amount of effort required by the
malicious IISP to overcome the solution. As such, the tunnel and the NAT based
approaches are difficult to be detected by the malicious IISP. On the other hand,
in the case of the BGP tuning approach, the malicious IISP can easily mimic the
BGP tuning implementation performed by the local region AS to blackhole the local
region AS traffic.
The services within the malicious IISP can be accessible only with the NAT-based
approach. On the other hand, the BGP tuning and tunnel-based approaches do not
provide accessibility to such services. Finally, in the case of scalability which refers
to the easiness of extending the method to use the entire Internet, all approaches
provide high scalability.
Chapter 5
Design, Implementation and
Validation of Solution
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we have discussed different approaches to circumvent the
malicious act of IISP to the local region while advertising reachability information
to it and to the rest of the Internet. In this chapter, we will discuss the design, im-
plementation, and validation of the tunnel based solution to Internet access denial
problem using OPNET.
OPNET [10] is a commercial tool used to design, test, and simulate the performance
of a network. Almost all the well known protocols are implemented in OPNET. For
the purpose of design, implementation, and validation of the solution we used OP-
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NET version 14.0 [38] which provides tunneling protocol support, and BGP protocol
support and configuration. An OPNET user can configure autonomous systems, and
interior and exterior gateway routing protocols such as EBGP, IBGP, RIP, OSPF,
EIGRP, etc. The user can also configure different tunneling protocols such as IPinIP,
GRE, GRE with check sum, and IPSec. While simulating the proposed solution,
IPSec was not considered, as it is not supported by OPNET’s Discrete Event Sim-
ulation (DES) that is needed in our simulations.
The following chapter is organised as follows. First, the baseline configuration to
serve as a reference point for our tunnel based solution is shown. Second, the con-
figuration for the tunnel based solution is presented. Finally, the validation of the
proposed solution is shown and followed by a discussion on the scalability issue of
the proposed solution.
5.1.1 Initial Baseline Setup
In order to validate our solution, we need to have a network setup that is suitable
for validating our implementation. Figure 5.1 shows the experimental setup, and it
also shows the sub-nets for each and every interface in the network. The description
of the Figure 5.1 is similar to Figure 1.1 except that a tunnel is created between
the router R2 and router R5. We will discuss all the devices that are used in the
experimental setup in the following section.
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Figure 5.1: Experimental Network Setup: Initial Design of Tunnel-Based Solution
with Single Tunnel
5.1.2 Devices Used
In this section, we briefly present the different OPNET devices used for the imple-
mentation of the network.
ethernet4 slip8 gtwy adv router:
This node model represents an IP-based gateway, supports four Ethernet hub in-
terfaces and eight serial line interfaces at selectable data rates. It also supports IP,
UDP, RIP, Ethernet (IEEE 802.3), OSPF, and SLIP protocols. The router also
supports the tunnel interfaces and there is no restriction on the number of tunnels
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that can be established. IP packets arriving on any interface are routed to the ap-
propriate output interface based on their destination IP address. The experimental
network setup consists of six such routers and are labeled from R1 to R6. These
routers are configured to support BGP protocol, and a tunnel was created from the
gateway router of the local region to the gateway router of the destination region.
In the experimental setup, the local gateway router is R2 and one of the possible
destination gateway router is R5. EBGP is configured between the ASes, and IBGP
is configured within the ASes.
100BaseT LAN object:
This is a fast Ethernet LAN in a switched topology. The object contains any number
of clients as well as only one server. Client traffic can be directed to the internal
server as well as to external servers. Supported applications include: FTP, Email,
Database, Custom, Rlogin, Video, HTTP, etc. These applications run over TCP or
UDP. The default number of workstations included in the object is 10. The baseline
simulation consists of two objects named LAN R1 and LAN R6. In this setup,
LAN R6 is configured to serve as a server LAN and is also configured to provide all
types of applications. LAN R1 is configured to be used as a client in the local region
and is also configured to request applications such as FTP, Video conferencing, and
HTTP for validation of the solution.
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Bidirectional PPP DS1 link:
This is used to connect two nodes running IP protocol using IP datagram packet
format over DS1 at a data rate of 1.544 Mbps. In the simulation setup, this type of
links is used to connect routers with each other.
Bidirectional 100BaseT link:
This is an Ethernet link that operates at 100Mbps. In the simulation setup, this
type of links is used to connect LAN objects to the router.
5.1.3 Mapping Devices Usage to our problem
In our simulation, we assume that AS 100 which contains R1 and R2 is in the local
region, and LAN R1 is one of the clients in the local region. LAN R1 communicates
with LAN R6 that is located in AS400 to get the desired services. Router R2 acts
as the local region provider and it is connected to one of the international service
provider routers (i.e., router R4 in AS300). As stated earlier in section 5.1.2, a
tunnel have been created between R2 and R5.
5.2 Baseline Simulation Setup
The baseline simulation considers no tunnel establishment in the network. In the
baseline setup, the local traffic is routed through the malicious IISP (i.e., AS300) and
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the AS-path that the local traffic follows is AS300, then AS400 to reach LAN R6.
The complete path from LAN R1 to LAN R6 is as follows: LAN R1, R1, R2, R4,
R5, R6, then LAN R6. This is done only for the purpose of comparing our proposed
solution to baseline experimental simulation (i.e. original route).
In Figure 5.2, the X-axis represents the time in seconds and the Y-axis represents
the throughput in bits per second. Figure 5.2 shows the throughput between R2
and R4, and between R2 and R3 in both directions. We notice that the traffic
flows between R2 and R4 in both directions. On the other hand, traffic does not
flow between R2 and R3 in both directions. The reason behind such a behavior
is that local region traffic is routed through the original path assuming that IISP
(i.e., AS300) is not blocking the Internet access to the local AS (i.e., AS100). This
validate the baseline simulation, the baseline performance can be compared to the
performance of the proposed solution.
To validate the forwarding settings of the different routers such as the entry point
of the tunnel router, the exit point of the tunnel router, the malicious router, and
the proper malicious router interface selection for traffic forwarding, we can examine
the IP forwarding table of R2, R4, and R5. From the tables we can determine the
incoming and outgoing traffic of the local region (i.e., AS100). The IP address of
LAN R6 is 192.0.7.2 and it belongs to the prefix 192.0.7.0/24. We can notice from
Table 5.1 that the ‘Next Hop Node’ to this prefix is through router R4. Hence, the
outgoing traffic is validated.
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Figure 5.2: Baseline Configuration Setup: Incoming and Outgoing Traffic between
R2 and R4 and between R2 and R3 (a) Throughput (bps) R2 to R4 (b) Throughput
(bps) R4 to R2 (c) Throughput (bps) R3 to R2 (d) Throughput (bps) R2 to R3
The IP address of LAN R1 is 192.0.0.2 and it belongs to the prefix 192.0.0.0/24. We
can notice from Table 5.2 that the ‘Next Hop Node’ to this prefix is through router
R2. Similarly, if we examine Table 5.3, we can notice that the ‘Next Hop Node’ to
this prefix is through router R4. Therefore, the incoming traffic is validated.
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Table 5.1: Baseline Configuration Setup: IP Forwarding Table at Router R2.
a b c d e f g h i
192.0.0.0/24 RIP 120 1 192.0.1.1 R1 IF10 N/A 8.423
192.0.1.0/24 Direct 0 0 192.0.1.2 R2 IF10 N/A 0
192.0.2.0/24 Direct 0 0 192.0.2.1 R2 IF4 N/A 0
192.0.3.0/24 Direct 0 0 192.0.3.1 R2 IF11 N/A 0
192.0.4.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.3.2 R3 IF11 N/A 70.004
192.0.5.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.2.2 R4 IF4 N/A 70.004
192.0.6.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.2.2 R4 IF4 N/A 70.008
192.0.7.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.2.2 R4 IF4 N/A 70.007
192.0.11.0/24 RIP 120 1 192.0.1.1 R1 IF10 N/A 8.423
192.0.12.0/24 Direct 0 0 192.0.12.1 R2 LB0 N/A 0
192.0.13.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.3.2 R3 IF11 N/A 70.004
192.0.14.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.2.2 R4 IF4 N/A 70.004
192.0.15.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.2.2 R4 IF4 N/A 70.009
192.0.16.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.2.2 R4 IF4 N/A 70.007
(a) Destination (b) Source Protocol (c) Route Preference (d) Metric
(e) Next Hop Address (f) Next Hop Node (g)Outgoing Interface
(h) Outgoing LSP (i) Insertion Time (sec)
Table 5.2: Baseline Configuration Setup: IP Forwarding Table at Router R4.
a b c d e f g h i
192.0.0.0/24 BGP 20 1 192.0.2.1 R2 IF10 N/A 70.005
192.0.1.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.2.1 R2 IF10 N/A 70.004
192.0.2.0/24 Direct 0 0 192.0.2.2 R4 IF10 N/A 0
192.0.3.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.2.1 R2 IF10 N/A 70.007
192.0.4.0/24 Direct 0 0 192.0.4.2 R4 IF11 N/A 0
192.0.5.0/24 Direct 0 0 192.0.5.1 R4 IF4 N/A 0
192.0.6.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.5.2 R5 IF4 N/A 70.005
192.0.7.0/24 BGP 20 1 192.0.5.2 R5 IF4 N/A 70.004
192.0.11.0/24 BGP 20 1 192.0.2.1 R2 IF10 N/A 70.004
192.0.12.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.2.1 R2 IF10 N/A 70.006
192.0.13.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.4.1 R3 IF11 N/A 70.004
192.0.14.0/24 Direct 0 0 192.0.14.1 R4 LB0 N/A 0
192.0.15.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.5.2 R5 IF4 N/A 70.006
192.0.16.0/24 BGP 20 1 192.0.5.2 R5 IF4 N/A 70.004
(a) Destination (b) Source Protocol (c) Route Preference (d) Metric
(e) Next Hop Address (f) Next Hop Node (g)Outgoing Interface
(h) Outgoing LSP (i) Insertion Time (sec)
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Table 5.3: Baseline Configuration Setup: IP Forwarding Table at Router R5.
a b c d e f g h i
192.0.0.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.008
192.0.1.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.007
192.0.2.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.005
192.0.3.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 N/A 100.005
192.0.4.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.005
192.0.5.0/24 Direct 0 0 192.0.5.2 R5 IF10 N/A 0
192.0.6.0/24 Direct 0 0 192.0.6.1 R5 IF11 N/A 0
192.0.7.0/24 RIP 120 1 192.0.6.2 R6 IF11 N/A 5.975
192.0.11.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.007
192.0.12.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.009
192.0.13.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.006
192.0.14.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.004
192.0.15.0/24 Direct 0 0 192.0.15.1 R5 LB0 N/A 0
192.0.16.0/24 RIP 120 1 192.0.6.2 R6 IF11 N/A 5.975
(a) Destination (b) Source Protocol (c) Route Preference (d) Metric
(e) Next Hop Address (f) Next Hop Node (g)Outgoing Interface
(h) Outgoing LSP (i) Insertion Time (sec)
5.3 Proposed Simulation Setup
In this setup, the same baseline network for simulation was used in addition to
creating a tunnel between R2 and R5 that passes through R3. The non-blocked IP
address that is provided by the neighbouring AS (i.e., AS200) was used to create the
tunnel. Thus, with the help of a neighbouring AS, a tunnel that passes through the
malicious ISP (i.e., AS300) was created. The use of a non-blocked IP address will
prevent the malicious router (i.e., router R4) from dropping incoming and outgoing
local region traffic.
To create a tunnel, we need a prefix to be used for the tunnel interface. In the
simulation, the chosen prefix belongs to subnet 200.0.0.0/24. The tunnel starting
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point IP address is 200.0.0.1, the tunnel ending point IP address is 200.0.0.2, and
the tunnel name is Tunnel0. The starting point of the tunnel is interface IF11 of
router R2, and its non-tunnel IP address is 192.0.3.1. All settings associated with
configuring the starting point of the tunnel are is shown in Figure 5.3. The ending
point of the tunnel is interface IF10 of router R5, and its non-tunnel IP address is
192.0.5.2. All settings associated with configuring the ending point of the tunnel are
shown in Figure 5.4. The routing protocol used for the tunnel interface is OSPF,
the other routing protocol that can be used for the tunnel interface is Enhanced
Interior Gateway Routing Protocol (EIGRP). Only OSPF is considered as a tunnel
interface routing protocol in the simulation because EIGRP is a CISCO proprietary
routing protocol and the target of our solution is to use standard protocols only.
Figure 5.5 shows the IP tunnel traffic received and sent in bits per seconds on
routers R2 and R5. To validate that the proposed solution is setup to forward the
traffic properly through the tunnel, we can examine the IP forwarding table on both
routers R2 and R5. Such tables are presented in Table 5.4 and Table 5.5. From the
tables we can determine that the incoming and the outgoing traffic on router R2
and router R5, respectively, use Tunnel0. This validates the proper setup for the
tunnel.
42
Figure 5.3: Tunnel Configuration on Router R2
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Figure 5.4: Tunnel Configuration on Router R5
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Table 5.4: Tunnel Configuration: IP Forwarding Table at Router R2.
a b c d e f g h i
192.0.0.0/24 RIP 120 1 192.0.1.1 R1 IF10 N/A 9.713
192.0.1.0/24 Direct 0 0 192.0.1.2 R2 IF10 N/A 0
192.0.2.0/24 Direct 0 0 192.0.2.1 R2 IF4 N/A 0
192.0.3.0/24 Direct 0 0 192.0.3.1 R2 IF11 N/A 0
192.0.4.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.3.2 R3 IF11 N/A 70.004
192.0.5.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.3.2 R3 IF11 N/A 70.006
192.0.6.0/24 OSPF 1 5 20 200.0.0.2 R5 Tunnel0 N/A 94.125
192.0.7.0/24 OSPF 1 5 20 200.0.0.2 R5 Tunnel0 N/A 94.125
192.0.11.0/24 RIP 120 1 192.0.1.1 R1 IF10 N/A 9.713
192.0.12.0/24 Direct 0 0 192.0.12.1 R2 LB0 N/A 0
192.0.13.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.3.2 R3 IF11 N/A 70.004
192.0.14.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.3.2 R3 IF11 N/A 70.006
192.0.15.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.3.2 R3 IF11 N/A 70.009
192.0.16.0/24 OSPF 1 5 20 200.0.0.2 R5 Tunnel0 N/A 94.125
200.0.0.0/24 Direct 0 0 200.0.0.1 R2 Tunnel0 N/A 0
(a) Destination (b) Source Protocol (c) Route Preference (d) Metric
(e) Next Hop Address (f) Next Hop Node (g)Outgoing Interface
(h) Outgoing LSP (i) Insertion Time (sec)
Table 5.5: Tunnel Configuration: IP Forwarding Table at Router R5.
a b c d e f g h i
192.0.0.0/24 OSPF 1 5 20 200.0.0.1 R2 Tunnel0 N/A 94.126
192.0.1.0/24 OSPF 1 5 20 200.0.0.1 R2 Tunnel0 N/A 94.126
192.0.2.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.005
192.0.3.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.007
192.0.4.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.005
192.0.5.0/24 Direct 0 0 192.0.5.2 R5 IF10 N/A 0
192.0.6.0/24 Direct 0 0 192.0.6.1 R5 IF11 N/A 0
192.0.7.0/24 RIP 120 1 192.0.6.2 R6 IF11 N/A 6.976
192.0.11.0/24 OSPF 1 5 20 200.0.0.1 R2 Tunnel0 N/A 94.126
192.0.12.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.009
192.0.13.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.006
192.0.14.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.004
192.0.15.0/24 Direct 0 0 192.0.15.1 R5 LB0 N/A 0
192.0.16.0/24 RIP 120 1 192.0.6.2 R6 IF11 N/A 6.976
200.0.0.0/24 Direct 0 0 200.0.0.2 R5 Tunnel0 N/A 0
(a) Destination (b) Source Protocol (c) Route Preference (d) Metric
(e) Next Hop Address (f) Next Hop Node (g)Outgoing Interface
(h) Outgoing LSP (i) Insertion Time (sec)
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Figure 5.5: IP Tunnel Traffic Received and Sent (bits per seconds) on Tunnel0 at
Router R2 and R5 (a) Tunnel Traffic Received (bps) at Router R2 (b) Tunnel Traffic
Sent (bps) at Router R2 (c) Tunnel Traffic Received (bps) at Router R5 (d) Tunnel
Traffic Sent (bps) at Router R5
5.4 Scalability Issue of the Propose Solution
In this section, we investigate the scalability issues related to the proposed solution.
The term scalability refers to the easiness of extending the proposed method to
access any part of the Internet. Different scalability designs are discussed in terms
of use of multiple tunnels, using existing tunnel to route the traffic to neighbours of
the tunneled AS, load balancing, and increasing the number of users in the LAN.
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5.4.1 Extending Tunnel-Based Solution Design to Multiple
Tunnels
There is no real limit to the number of tunnels that can be created. We can have
several tunnel interfaces, as long as we do not use the same combination of source,
destination, and tunnel mode more than once. For the validation purpose, we created
another tunnel interface (i.e. Tunnel1) between router R2 (i.e., AS100) and router
R8 (i.e., AS600), shown in Figure 5.6. We can verify the creation of multiple tunnels
from the IP forwarding table of router R2, as shown in the Table 5.6. We can also
verify this by examining the IP forwarding table for router R8 that is shown in
Table 5.7. This confirms the creation of the second tunnel that is terminated at
router R8.
5.4.2 Extending Tunnel-Based Solution Design to Multiple
ASes
It is desired that the proposed solution allows the affected region to reach ASes
that are not necessarily the immediate neighbors of the malicious AS. However, as
it will be noted later in this section, such extension requires manual configurations
at the proper routers. Accordingly, one of the concerns regarding the proposed
solution that should be looked into is how frequent are the changes in the paths
established between one AS and another. If the change is too frequent, then the
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Table 5.6: Multiple ASes Tunnel Configuration: IP Forwarding Table at Router R2.
a b c d e f g h i
192.0.0.0/24 RIP 120 1 192.0.1.1 R1 IF10 N/A 9.546
192.0.1.0/24 Direct 0 0 192.0.1.2 R2 IF10 N/A 0
192.0.2.0/24 Direct 0 0 192.0.2.1 R2 IF4 N/A 0
192.0.3.0/24 Direct 0 0 192.0.3.1 R2 IF11 N/A 0
192.0.4.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.3.2 R3 IF11 N/A 70.005
192.0.5.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.3.2 R3 IF11 N/A 70.007
192.0.6.0/24 OSPF 1 5 20 200.0.0.2 R5 Tunnel0 N/A 86.004
192.0.7.0/24 OSPF 1 5 20 200.0.0.2 R5 Tunnel0 N/A 86.004
192.0.8.0/24 OSPF 1 5 20 200.0.0.2 R5 Tunnel0 N/A 86.004
192.0.9.0/24 OSPF 1 5 1 200.0.0.2 R5 Tunnel0 N/A 86.004
192.0.10.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.3.2 R3 IF11 N/A 70.007
192.0.11.0/24 RIP 120 1 192.0.1.1 R1 IF10 N/A 9.546
192.0.12.0/24 Direct 0 0 192.0.12.1 R2 LB0 N/A 0
192.0.13.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.3.2 R3 IF11 N/A 70.004
192.0.14.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.3.2 R3 IF11 N/A 70.006
192.0.15.0/24 OSPF 1 5 20 200.0.0.2 R5 Tunnel0 N/A 86.004
192.0.16.0/24 OSPF 1 5 20 200.0.0.2 R5 Tunnel0 N/A 86.004
192.0.17.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.3.2 R3 IF11 N/A 70.015
192.0.18.0/24 OSPF 1 5 20 200.0.0.2 R5 Tunnel0 N/A 86.004
192.0.19.0/24 OSPF 1 5 20 200.0.1.2 R8 Tunnel01 N/A 86.004
192.0.20.0/24 OSPF 1 5 20 200.0.1.2 R8 Tunnel01 N/A 86.004
192.0.21.0/24 OSPF 1 5 20 200.0.1.2 R8 Tunnel01 N/A 86.004
192.0.22.0/24 OSPF 1 5 20 200.0.1.2 R8 Tunnel01 N/A 86.004
192.0.23.0/24 OSPF 1 5 1 200.0.1.2 R8 Tunnel01 N/A 86.004
192.0.24.0/24 OSPF 1 5 1 200.0.0.2 R5 Tunnel0 N/A 86.004
192.0.25.0/24 OSPF 1 5 20 200.0.1.2 R8 Tunnel01 N/A 86.004
192.0.26.0/24 OSPF 1 5 20 200.0.1.2 R8 Tunnel01 N/A 86.004
192.0.27.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.3.2 R3 IF11 N/A 70.015
192.0.28.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.3.2 R3 IF11 N/A 70.097
192.0.29.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.3.2 R3 IF11 N/A 70.004
200.0.0.0/24 Direct 0 0 200.0.0.1 R2 Tunnel0 N/A 0
200.0.1.0/24 Direct 0 0 200.0.1.1 R2 Tunnel01 N/A 0
(a) Destination (b) Source Protocol (c) Route Preference (d) Metric
(e) Next Hop Address (f) Next Hop Node (g)Outgoing Interface
(h) Outgoing LSP (i) Insertion Time (sec)
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Table 5.7: Multiple ASes Tunnel Configuration: IP Forwarding Table at Router R8.
a b c d e f g h i
192.0.0.0/24 OSPF 1 5 20 200.0.1.1 R2 Tunnel01 N/A 86.002
192.0.1.0/24 OSPF 1 5 20 200.0.1.1 R2 Tunnel01 N/A 86.002
192.0.2.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.10.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.006
192.0.3.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.10.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.009
192.0.4.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.10.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.005
192.0.5.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.10.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.005
192.0.6.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.10.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.011
192.0.7.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.10.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.01
192.0.8.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.10.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.01
192.0.9.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.10.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.014
192.0.10.0/24 Direct 0 0 192.0.10.2 R8 IF10 N/A 0
192.0.11.0/24 OSPF 1 5 20 200.0.1.1 R2 Tunnel01 N/A 86.002
192.0.12.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.10.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.014
192.0.13.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.10.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.008
192.0.14.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.10.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.004
192.0.15.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.10.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.009
192.0.16.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.10.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.008
192.0.17.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.10.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.013
192.0.18.0/24 IBGP 200 0 192.0.26.1 R9 Unresolved N/A 70.136
192.0.19.0/24 RIP 120 1 192.0.20.2 R9 IF11 N/A 9.444
192.0.20.0/24 Direct 0 0 192.0.20.1 R8 IF11 N/A 0
192.0.21.0/24 RIP 120 1 192.0.20.2 R9 IF11 N/A 9.444
192.0.22.0/24 RIP 120 1 192.0.20.2 R9 IF11 N/A 9.444
192.0.23.0/24 IBGP 200 0 192.0.26.1 R9 Unresolved N/A 70.008
192.0.24.0/24 IBGP 200 0 192.0.26.1 R9 Unresolved N/A 70.109
192.0.25.0/24 Direct 0 0 192.0.25.1 R8 LB0 N/A 0
192.0.26.0/24 RIP 120 1 192.0.20.2 R9 IF11 N/A 9.444
192.0.27.0/24 IBGP 200 0 192.0.26.1 R9 Unresolved N/A 70.007
192.0.28.0/24 IBGP 200 0 192.0.26.1 R9 Unresolved N/A 70.095
192.0.29.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.10.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.007
200.0.0.0/24 OSPF 1 5 22222 200.0.1.1 R2 Tunnel01 N/A 86.002
200.0.1.0/24 Direct 0 0 200.0.1.2 R8 Tunnel01 N/A 0
(a) Destination (b) Source Protocol (c) Route Preference (d) Metric
(e) Next Hop Address (f) Next Hop Node (g)Outgoing Interface
(h) Outgoing LSP (i) Insertion Time (sec)
49
proposed solution becomes impractical. Thus, before discussing the extension of the
proposed solution to multiple ASes, we will first examine how steady the primary
paths are from one AS to others over a long period of time by considering one of
the mandatory BGP attributes, i.e., BGP AS-PATH.
BGP AS-PATH Characteristics
Zhao et al. [39] examined and studied BGP AS-PATH characteristics over nearly
one year. To analize BGP routing updates, data was collected from Route Views
[40] from March 2002 to December 2002. During this ten month study, Zhao et
al. observed 236,395 prefixes. Their focus was only on the prefixes which were
announced longer than 40% of the total time that they were examining. In their
study, they focused only on the path behavior of long lasting prefixes, thus they
were interested in long-term AS path behavior. Some of the prefixes were falsely
announced due to router misconfigurations which were expected to be corrected
shortly. And, some of the falsely announced prefixes were due to traffic engineering
at the BGP level that may have introduced some short lived prefixes in the global
routing table. After filtering, they obtained only 116,544 prefixes. In the study of
path change patterns, they assumed that initially a prefix was the primary path.
Then at some time, another path may replace the primary path, and they counted
time intervals for how long it takes to replace the new path with the primary path.
The authors discovered that about 90% of the prefixes do not use an alternative
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path continuously for longer than 10 minutes. Hence, the authors conclude that
primary paths do not change over a long period of time and most of the primary
paths are very stable.
Multiple ASes
To make the solution scalable, we extend our initial design of the tunnel-based so-
lution to reach multiple ASes from the affected AS as shown in Figure 5.6. In this
setup, we utilize the existing tunnels established by the affected local region to send
and receive traffic to and from neighbouring ASes of the end point of the tunnels.
For example, from Figure 5.6, if the local region AS (i.e., AS100) wants to access
some services that are located at AS500, then AS100 can utilize the existing tunnel
established between R2 and R5 to send or receive the traffic to or from R5. Then,
the normal routing protocols can be used to deliver the traffic from/to R5 to/from
AS500.
To extend the reachability to other ASes through a tunnel route, redistribution
must be used. As demonstrated in the previous section, we note that the manual
redistribution of routing information is acceptable since most of the primary paths
are stable over a long period of time. The purpose of the route redistribution is
to propagate routes learned using one protocol into another routing protocol. For
example, network 192.0.9.0/24 on LAN R7 in the simulated network is populated
as an IBGP Route in the BGP forwarding table of Router R5 as shown in Table 5.8.
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Figure 5.6: Extended Design for Tunnel Based Solution Using Multiple Tunnels and
Multiple ASes
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Since the prefix is known to R5 through IBGP, and since it is desired to make the
same prefix reachable by R2 through the tunnel established between R2 and R5 and
that uses OSPF, then the prefix must be redistributed at R5. The route redistri-
bution value at R5 must be changed to both IBGP and EBGP so that the desired
prefix gets redistributed into the tunnel through the use of the OSPF protocol. The
steps on how to configure the route redistribution in OPNET are shown in Appendix
A.1.
To verify the route redistribution, we can examine the IP forwarding tables of
routers R2 and R5. From the routing table of router R2 shown in Table 5.6, we can
determine that the local region routes traffic destined to prefix 192.0.9.0/24 through
Tunnel0. In Table 5.6, we can also determine that the local region traffic destined to
prefix 192.0.29.0/24 will not utilize the tunnel and, instead, will follow the normal
BGP route as the tunnel is needed only if the traffic is routed through the malicious
AS (i.e., AS300). Similarly, if we examine the IP forwarding table of R5 shown in
Table 5.9, we can determine that Tunnel0 is used to route the traffic to the local
region (i.e., AS100).
Note that in Table 5.6 and Table 5.9, we observe that some of the values of the
Outgoing Interface are set to “Unresolved”. In such cases, BGP is unable to resolve
the next hop and the outgoing interface for that specific prefix. To explain the
reason behind such a behaviour, we note that when a BGP router receives a route,
the next hop address advertised with it may not be directly connected. Under such
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Table 5.8: BGP Forwarding Table at Router R5.
a b c d e f g h i j
192.0.0.0/24 EBGP 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 0 100 0 300 200 100 Incomplete
192.0.1.0/24 EBGP 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 0 100 0 300 200 100 Incomplete
192.0.2.0/24 EBGP 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 0 100 0 300 Incomplete
192.0.3.0/24 EBGP 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 0 100 0 300 200 Incomplete
192.0.4.0/24 EBGP 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 0 100 0 300 Incomplete
192.0.5.0/24 IBGP 192.0.16.1 R6 IF11 1 100 0 Incomplete
192.0.6.0/24 Direct 192.0.6.1 R5 IF11 0 100 32768 Incomplete
192.0.7.0/24 RIP 192.0.6.2 R6 IF11 1 100 32768 Incomplete
192.0.8.0/24 RIP 192.0.6.2 R6 IF11 1 100 32768 Incomplete
192.0.9.0/24 IBGP 192.0.16.1 R6 IF11 0 100 0 500 Incomplete
192.0.10.0/24 EBGP 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 0 100 0 300 Incomplete
192.0.11.0/24 EBGP 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 0 100 0 300 200 100 Incomplete
192.0.12.0/24 EBGP 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 0 100 0 300 200 100 Incomplete
192.0.13.0/24 EBGP 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 0 100 0 300 200 Incomplete
192.0.14.0/24 EBGP 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 0 100 0 300 Incomplete
192.0.15.0/24 Direct 192.0.15.1 R5 LB0 0 100 32768 Incomplete
192.0.16.0/24 RIP 192.0.6.2 R6 IF11 1 100 32768 Incomplete
192.0.17.0/24 IBGP 192.0.16.1 R6 IF11 0 100 0 500 Incomplete
192.0.18.0/24 RIP 192.0.6.2 R6 IF11 1 100 32768 Incomplete
192.0.19.0/24 IBGP 192.0.16.1 R6 IF11 0 100 0 800 Incomplete
192.0.20.0/24 EBGP 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 0 100 0 300 600 Incomplete
192.0.21.0/24 EBGP 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 0 100 0 300 600 Incomplete
192.0.22.0/24 EBGP 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 0 100 0 300 600 Incomplete
192.0.23.0/24 EBGP 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 0 100 0 300 600 700 Incomplete
192.0.24.0/24 IBGP 192.0.16.1 R6 IF11 0 100 0 800 Incomplete
192.0.25.0/24 EBGP 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 0 100 0 300 600 Incomplete
192.0.26.0/24 EBGP 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 0 100 0 300 600 Incomplete
192.0.27.0/24 EBGP 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 0 100 0 300 600 700 Incomplete
192.0.28.0/24 IBGP 192.0.16.1 R6 IF11 0 100 0 800 Incomplete
192.0.29.0/24 EBGP 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 0 100 0 300 200 Incomplete
200.0.0.0/24 IBGP 192.0.16.1 R6 IF11 1 100 0 Incomplete
200.0.1.0/24 EBGP 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 0 100 0 300 600 Incomplete
(a) Destination (b) Source Protocol (c) Next Hop Address (d) Next Hop Node (e) Outgoing
Interface (f) MED (g) Local preference (h) Weight (i) AS path (j) Origin
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Table 5.9: Multiple ASes Tunnel Configuration: IP Forwarding Table at Router R5.
a b c d e f g h i
192.0.0.0/24 OSPF 1 5 20 200.0.0.1 R2 Tunnel0 N/A 77.832
192.0.1.0/24 OSPF 1 5 20 200.0.0.1 R2 Tunnel0 N/A 77.832
192.0.2.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.006
192.0.3.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.009
192.0.4.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.005
192.0.5.0/24 Direct 0 0 192.0.5.2 R5 IF10 N/A 0
192.0.6.0/24 Direct 0 0 192.0.6.1 R5 IF11 N/A 0
192.0.7.0/24 RIP 120 1 192.0.6.2 R6 IF11 N/A 9.59
192.0.8.0/24 RIP 120 1 192.0.6.2 R6 IF11 N/A 9.59
192.0.9.0/24 IBGP 200 0 192.0.16.1 R4 Unresolved N/A 70.007
192.0.10.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.004
192.0.11.0/24 OSPF 1 5 20 200.0.0.1 R2 Tunnel0 N/A 77.832
192.0.12.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.014
192.0.13.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.008
192.0.14.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.004
192.0.15.0/24 Direct 0 0 192.0.15.1 R5 LB0 N/A 0
192.0.16.0/24 RIP 120 1 192.0.6.2 R6 IF11 N/A 9.59
192.0.17.0/24 IBGP 200 0 192.0.16.1 R6 Unresolved N/A 70.007
192.0.18.0/24 RIP 120 1 192.0.6.2 R6 IF11 N/A 9.59
192.0.19.0/24 IBGP 200 0 192.0.16.1 R6 Unresolved N/A 70.123
192.0.20.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.01
192.0.21.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.01
192.0.22.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.009
192.0.23.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.014
192.0.24.0/24 IBGP 200 0 192.0.16.1 R6 Unresolved N/A 70.109
192.0.25.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.008
192.0.26.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.007
192.0.27.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.013
192.0.28.0/24 IBGP 200 0 192.0.16.1 R6 Unresolved N/A 70.095
192.0.29.0/24 BGP 20 0 192.0.5.1 R4 IF10 N/A 70.007
200.0.0.0/24 Direct 0 0 200.0.0.2 R5 Tunnel0 N/A 0
200.0.1.0/24 OSPF 1 5 22222 200.0.0.1 R2 Tunnel0 N/A 77.832
(a) Destination (b) Source Protocol (c) Route Preference (d) Metric
(e) Next Hop Address (f) Next Hop Node (g)Outgoing Interface
(h) Outgoing LSP (i) Insertion Time (sec)
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a scenario, BGP does what is known as recursive lookup. If the next hop address
does not exist in the router’s routing table, it will then be shown as “Unresolved”.
5.4.3 Tunnel-Based Solution Design and Load Balancing Us-
ing a Pool of Public IP Addresses
Another tunnel-based solution scalability issue to be considered is the processing
requirement on the gateway router. At the gateway router, every packet is sent or
received through the tunnel, and must go through the encapsulation and decapsu-
lation process. This process increases the processing time at the gateway router.
However, through the use of multiple gateway routers and pools of public IP ad-
dresses, the load will be distributed on the gateway routers. A possible design for
load balancing is shown in Figure 5.7. In this design, the tunnels are distributed
among the gateway routers, and can potentially improve the performance.
5.4.4 Extending Tunnel-Based Solution Design with the In-
crease in the Number of Users
To validate our solution work for large number of users, we increase the number of
users from the default value of 10 users to 40 users as shown in Figure 5.8. Figure 5.9
shows the traffic between R2 and R4, and R2 and R3 in both directions. We notice
that the traffic goes through R2 and R4 in both directions and there is no traffic
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Figure 5.7: Tunnel-Based Solution Design for the Load Balancing
flowing between R2 and R3 in both directions as explained earlier. Figure 5.10
shows the IP tunnel traffic received and Sent in bits per seconds on router R2 and
router R5 when the number of users is increased to 40. The proposed solution is
valid for any number of users, as long as the data rate of the links of the network is
increased so that large amount of traffic can be sent and/or received on these links.
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Figure 5.8: Configuration for Number of workstation or Users
5.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have discussed the design, implementation, and validation of the
proposed solution. We also discussed the scalability issues related to the proposed
solution in terms of the support of multiple tunnels, multiple ASes, load balancing,
and the increase of the number of users.
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Figure 5.9: Incoming and Outgoing Traffic between R2 and R4 and between R2
and R3 When Number of Users or Workstations are Increase to 40 (a) Throughput
(bps) R2 to R4 (b) Throughput (bps) R4 to R2 (c) Throughput (bps) R3 to R2 (d)
Throughput (bps) R2 to R3
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Figure 5.10: IP Tunnel Traffic Received and Sent (bits per seconds) on Tunnel0 at
Router R2 and R5 When Number of Users or Workstations are Increase to 40 (a)
Tunnel Traffic Received (bps) at Router R2 (b) Tunnel Traffic Sent (bps) at Router
R2 (c) Tunnel Traffic Received (bps) at Router R5 (d) Tunnel Traffic Sent (bps) at
Router R5
Chapter 6
Performance Evaluation of the
Tunnel-Based Solution
6.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we have discussed the design, implementation, and valida-
tion of the tunnel-based solution to the Internet denial problem using OPNET. In
this chapter, we evaluate the performance of the tunnel-based solution as the use of
tunneling protocols introduces extra overhead to the packets entering the tunnel as
compared to normal packets. The amount of extra overhead bytes that will be added
depends on the type of tunneling protocol used. The tunneling protocols IP-in-IP,
GRE, and GRE with check sum add 20, 24, and 28 of extra overhead bytes, respec-
tively, to each packet entering the tunnel. Thus, in this chapter, we compare the
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performance of the tunnel-based solution to the normal operation (i.e., no malicious
activity by the IISP) in terms of end-to-end delay, traffic overhead, and packet drop
under different types of traffic and different network loads (number of users). The
performance evaluation is conducted by means of OPNET simulations.
6.2 Simulation Setup
The baseline network model shown in Figure 5.1 is used for the performance evalua-
tion. The total network simulation duration is set to 600 seconds. Moreover, several
simulation scenarios are considered by varying the type of tunneling protocol used,
the type of traffic, and the network load. Furthermore, each simulation scenario
is simulated for 5 different seeds/runs and the average of the 5 results is collected.
The performance statistics collected are the end-to-end delay, traffic overhead, and
packet drop.
The solution is evaluated against different types of traffic generated by well known
applications such as File Transfer Protocol (FTP), Video conferencing, and Hyper
Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP). Both FTP and HTTP run over the TCP proto-
col, whereas Video conferencing runs over the UDP protocol. In the simulations
conducted, we used HTTP1.1 (i.e., persistent HTTP) as it is the most commonly
used version of HTTP nowadays. Each simulation is run for three different traffic
loads: 25% of the available link bandwidth (about 386kbps), 50% of the available
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link bandwidth (about 772kbps) and 75% of the available link bandwidth (about
1158kbps).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. First, we discuss in details the packet
fragmentation that can be caused by the addition of extra overhead bytes to each
packet entering the tunnel. Second, the performance of the solution is evaluated
under different network loads, traffic types, and tunneling protocols. Finally, the
chapter is concluded by discussion and recommendations regarding the proposed
solution.
6.3 Tunnel Fragmentation
Each path that extends between two end systems allows a maximum number of bytes
to be transmitted per packet, and is considered to be the Maximum Transmission
Unit (MTU) for that path. Accordingly, tunnel fragmentation occurs when the size
of the encapsulated packet (i.e., original packet plus the extra tunnel overhead bytes)
exceeds the MTU of the tunnel path. Under such scenario, the encapsulated packet
will be divided (fragmented) into two smaller packets. The first packet is equal to
the size of the MTU and the other packet size is typically smaller than the MTU.
The two packets are then forwarded to the next router.
It should be noted that the configuration for the video conferencing application (i.e.,
UDP traffic) in the simulation uses a constant file size measured in bytes, and the
63
file size is smaller than the MTU. In the case of video conferencing, the number of
packets used is the same for all the tunneling protocol scenarios and also for the no
tunnel scenario, because the requested file is smaller than the MTU. Thus, the only
difference between the different video conferencing tunneling scenarios is in the size
of each packet which varies in accordance with the tunneling protocol used.
On the other hand, the configuration for FTP and HTTP (i.e., TCP traffic) in the
simulation also uses a constant file size, but the file size measured in bytes for no
tunnel and tunnel is larger than the MTU to simulate typical file sizes under such
applications. Before entering the tunnel, the server divides the file into packets
equal to the size of the MTU. Once the packet is sent by the server and enters the
tunnel, a tunnel overhead is added to the packet and the size of the new packet is
larger than the MTU. As a result, the new packet is fragmented into two packets
and forwarded to the next router.
In summary, we can conclude that a packet will be fragmented into two packets only
if the size the packet after the addition of the tunnel header is larger than the MTU.
6.4 Performance Metrics and Results
A number of performance metrics are investigated in the evaluation. The first metric
is the end-to-end delay, measured in seconds, at LAN R1. The second metric is the
throughput, measured in bits per second, at the link between R5 to R4. The R5 to
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R4 link is selected because the tunnel overhead can be examined at this link with
respect to each tunneling protocol. The third and the final metric measures the
packet drop at router R5. Note that packet drop can be encountered when switching
from a non-tunnel link to a tunnel link as the tunnel may cause an increase in the
number of packets as a result of fragmentation, and may demand more processing
from the router. Thus, router R5 is selected to measure packet drop as it is the
closest router to the source of traffic (i.e., the server in LAN R6) that implements a
tunnel. The results for the metrics are generated for each traffic type, for different
traffic loads, and for each tunneling protocol.
6.4.1 Simulation for End-to-End Delay
The three traffic loads (i.e., 25%, 50%, and 75%) are simulated for both TCP (FTP,
HTTP) and UDP (video conferencing) based applications to measure the end-to-
end delay. The end-to-end delay refers to the amount of time that a packet takes to
travel from the client to the server. The end-to-end delay includes the transmission
time, the propagation time, and the queuing delay.
For the purpose of the simulation, the FTP application is simulated with two dif-
ferent file sizes; 50KB and 100KB. On the other hand, the HTTP and video confer-
encing applications use only one file of size 4640B and 1172B, respectively.
To achieve the desired traffic load for FTP, HTTP, and video conferencing on the
links, the number of users is increased. For 25%, 50%, and 75% traffic load, the
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number of users is set in the simulation to 10, 20, and 30 users, respectively. In the
case of FTP and HTTP, both the file size in bytes and the inter request time in
seconds are constant. Similarly, for video conferencing both the frame size in bytes
and the frame inter arrival time in seconds are constant.
TCP traffic is considered first for the evaluation of the effect of the tunnel on the
total end-to-end delay. For the end-to-end delay metric, all the figures are plotted
for 25%, 50% and 75% traffic loads. The figures are plotted for both the no tunnel
case and the tunnel case using different tunneling protocols such as IP-in-IP, GRE,
and GRE with checksum enabled.
FTP is simulated as requests to download a file from the server in LAN R6. Like-
wise, HTTP is simulated as requests for a web page from the server in LAN R6.
It should be noted that FTP and HTTP run over TCP which requires connection
establishment. Moreover, we point out that the TCP header is considerably larger
than the UDP header.
The results for the FTP application for the file sizes 50KB and 100KB are shown
in Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2, respectively. The figures show the percentage of
increase in the end-to-end delay computed as (DelayWithTunnel−DelayNoTunnel)
DelayNoTunnel
∗100. The
percentage of increase in the end-to-end delay is caused by the introduction of the
tunnel. From the figures, it can be seen that the percentage of increase in end-to-end
delay for the case of 100KB file size is more than the case of 50KB file size due to the
fact that the 100KB file requires more queuing in routers buffers. Furthermore, the
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figures display that as the traffic load increases, this percentage decreases. We also
note that the IP-in-IP tunneling protocol has the least percentage of increase in the
end-to-end delay. The observation is justified by noting that IP-in-IP tunneling pro-
tocol adds the least amount of overhead among the tunneling protocols considered,
and therefore, produces the least amount of fragmentation. For the completeness
of the results, we show in Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4 the absolute value for the
end-to-end delay for both file sizes. The absolute increase in the end-to-end delay
for both file sizes is shown in Figure 6.5 and Figure 6.6 and it is computed as
(DelayWithTunnel −DelayNoTunnel).
The results for the HTTP application for the percentage of increase in end-to-end
delay is shown in Figure 6.7. From the figures, it can be observed that the IP-in-IP
tunneling protocol has the lowest increase in the end-to-end delay. Moreover, it is
clear from the figure that as the traffic load increases, the percentage of increase
decreases. For the completeness of the results, we show in Figure 6.8 the absolute
value for the end-to-end delay. The absolute increase in the end-to-end delay is
shown in Figure 6.9. When comparing the end-to-end delay results for FTP and
HTTP, we note that the HTTP application is simulated by considering HTTP1.1
persistent TCP connections. With a persistent TCP connection, the server leaves
the TCP connection open after the response. Subsequent requests and responses
between the same pair of client and server can be sent over the existing TCP con-
nection. This is not the case with the FTP application, where the TCP connection
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Figure 6.1: Percentage of Increase in End-to-End Delay (Sec) - FTP(TCP)- 50K
Figure 6.2: Percentage of Increase in End-to-End Delay (Sec) - FTP(TCP)- 100K
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Figure 6.3: Absolute End-to-End Delay (Sec)- FTP(TCP)- 50K
Figure 6.4: Absolute End-to-End Delay (Sec)- FTP(TCP)- 100K
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Figure 6.5: Absolute Increase in End-to-End Delay (Sec) - FTP(TCP)- 50K
Figure 6.6: Absolute Increase in End-to-End Delay (Sec) - FTP(TCP)- 100K
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Figure 6.7: Percentage of Increase in End-to-End Delay (Sec) - HTTP(TCP)
Figure 6.8: Absolute End-to-End Delay (Sec)- HTTP(TCP)
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Figure 6.9: Absolute Increase in End-to-End Delay (Sec) - HTTP(TCP)
is closed after the response is sent by the server. Due to this, the percentage of
increase in the end-to-end delay is less for the HTTP application when compared
with the FTP application.
The last application considered in the simulation is video conferencing which runs
over UDP. The end-to-end delay results show similar behaviour to the results ob-
tained for FTP and HTTP. We can see from Figure 6.10 that the absolute value
for the end-to-end delay increases as the traffic load increases. Figure 6.11 shows
the absolute amount of increase in the end-to-end delay caused by the introduction
of the tunnel. The absolute increase in the end-to-end delay is constant with the
increase of traffic load. This is mainly due to the fact that the size of the video
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conferencing file is relatively small, and that the video conferencing application runs
over UDP protocol (i.e., connectionless protocol) that does not wait for acknowl-
edgements. Similar to FTP and HTTP, we see that the IP-in-IP tunneling protocol
has the least amount of increase in the end-to-end delay. Moreover, the percentage
of increase in the end-to-end delay is shown in Figure 6.12, and as evident it shows
a lower percentage of increase in the end-to-end delay than the results for the TCP
traffic. Furthermore, Figure 6.12 shows that as the traffic load increases, the per-
centage of increase in end-to-end delay decreases. This is mainly due to the fact that
UDP has smaller overhead as compared to TCP, and that UDP is a connectionless
protocol that does not wait for acknowledgements.
6.4.2 Simulation of Traffic Overhead
The traffic overhead, in bits per seconds, measures the amount of overhead bits
added to each packet entering the tunnel. The same simulation setup as in section
6.4.1 is used where the three scenarios of 25%, 50%, and 75% traffic are simulated,
and with different tunneling protocols. The simulation is set to measure the traffic
overhead at the link R5 to R4 where the tunnel starts.
The results for the FTP application for the file sizes 50KB and 100KB are shown in
Figure 6.13 and Figure 6.14, respectively. The figures show the percentage of in-
crease in the overhead for different file sizes and it is computed as (OverheadWithTunnel−OverheadNoTunnel)
OverheadNoTunnel
∗
100. The percentage of increase behaviour for both file sizes follow similar trends.
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Figure 6.10: Absolute End-to-End Delay (Sec) - Video(UDP)
Figure 6.11: Absolute Increase in End-to-End Delay (Sec) - Video(UDP)
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Figure 6.12: Percentage of Increase in End-to-End Delay (Sec) - Video(UDP)
For the completeness of the results, we show in Figure 6.15 and Figure 6.16 the ab-
solute value for throughput. The absolute overhead of the tunnel is shown in Figure
6.17 and Figure 6.18 for both file sizes, and it is computed as (ThroughputWithTunnel−
ThroughputNoTunnel). It represents the amount of overhead that is caused by the
introduction of the tunnel.
The results for the HTTP application for the percentage of increase in the traffic
overhead are shown in Figure 6.19. As observed from Figure 6.19, the percentage
of increase behaviour for HTTP follows a similar trend as FTP, but the percentage
of increase is comparatively less than FTP. This is due to the fact that HTTP1.1
uses persistent TCP connections. Therefore, HTTP uses less number of connections
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Figure 6.13: Percentage of Increase in Overhead - FTP(TCP)- (R5 to R4) -50K
Figure 6.14: Percentage of Increase in Overhead - FTP(TCP)- (R5 to R4) -100K
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Figure 6.15: Absolute Throughput (bps) - FTP(TCP) - (R5 to R4))-50K
Figure 6.16: Absolute Throughput (bps) - FTP(TCP) - (R5 to R4)-100K
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Figure 6.17: Absolute Overhead (bps) - FTP(TCP)-(R5 to R4)-50K
Figure 6.18: Absolute Overhead (bps) - FTP(TCP)-(R5 to R4)-100K
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than FTP, and results in less overhead. For the completeness of the results, we show
in Figure 6.20 the absolute value for the throughput. The absolute increase in the
overhead is shown in Figure 6.21.
The last application considered in the simulation is video conferencing which
runs over UDP. The traffic overhead results show similar behaviour to the results
obtained for FTP and HTTP. We observe from Figure 6.22 that the percentage of
increase in the traffic overhead is the same with different traffic loads. This is due to
the fact that a small file size was used for the experiments per the presetting of the
simulator. It can also be noted that the percentage increase in the traffic overhead,
shown in Figure 6.22 is lower than the increase in throughput for the TCP traf-
fic. As stated earlier, this is mainly caused because UDP has smaller overhead when
compared to TCP, and that UDP is a connectionless protocol. The above mentioned
factors cause small percentage of increase in the traffic overhead for UDP traffic.
For the completeness of the results, we show in Figure 6.23 the absolute value for
the throughput. Furthermore, we show in Figure 6.24 the amount of absolute traffic
overhead that is caused by the introduction of the tunnel. It can be observed from
the figure that the IP-in-IP tunneling protocol has the least amount of increase in
traffic overhead as it adds the smallest header size among the other tunneling pro-
tocols.
In conclusion, UDP-based traffic has the least amount of increase in the tunnel
overhead when compared to the TCP-based traffic. To further make the comparison
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Figure 6.19: Percentage of Increase in Overhead HTTP(TCP)-(R5 to R4)
Figure 6.20: Absolute Throughput - HTTP(TCP)-(R5 to R4)
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Figure 6.21: Absolute Overhead (bps) - HTTP(TCP)-(R5 to R4)
Figure 6.22: Percentage of Increase in Overhead Video(UDP)-(R5 to R4)
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Figure 6.23: Absolute Throughput (bps)- Video(UDP)-(R5 to R4)
Figure 6.24: Absolute Overhead (bps) - Video(UDP)-(R5 to R4)
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fair, an experiment was conducted with a small file size for the FTP application. The
results of the experiment confirmed that the UDP-based traffic incurs less amount
of tunnel overhead than TCP-based traffic.
6.4.3 Simulation of Packet Drop
The last metric considered in the simulations is packet drop. The main reason
behind a packet drop is routers buffer over flow. In the experiments, we reduced
the default value of the buffer size from 1MB to 100KB. This is done to examine
the effect of tunneling protocol on the proposed solution. If the buffer size is kept
at the default value, no packet drop can be observed. The experiments are done
with high load traffic on the links (i.e., 94.91% and 98.80% link utilization for TCP
traffic and UDP traffic, respectively) in order to examine the effects of tunneling on
packet drops.
In order to simulate TCP traffic for the packet drop scenario, we have considered only
the FTP application. On the other hand, the HTTP application is not considered
for the simulation because, under a high traffic load scenario, the OPNET simulation
of HTTP is not behaving as expected, and some of the simulated user connections
requested get cancelled. According to OPNET documentation [41], a user cancelled
connection occurs in OPNET when the client tries to set up a connection to the
server while a connection is already open to that server, the requested page download
is in progress, or the user clicks on the link on a page that is still downloading.
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OPNET support was contacted for the user cancelled connection scenario of HTTP
application and could not confirm that such behaviour occurs in real networks.
Moreover, we have looked at the HTTP standard (RFC 2616) [42] and the standard
does not have any references to user cancelled connections.
Figure 6.25 and Figure 6.26 show the maximum instantaneous percentage of traffic
drop in bits per seconds and packets per seconds, respectively. The traffic drop in
the case of video application is the lowest. The traffic drop for the FTP 100KB file
size is less when compared to the 50KB file size because in the 100KB file size case
the frequency of packet drop is more. To know the frequency of packet drops, we
need to consider detailed figures that are shown in Appendix B.1. In the case of no
tunnel and IP-in-IP tunneling, packet drops are not observed in all the applications,
except for FTP 100KB file size case. This is due to the fact that the larger size of
files being transferred will cause more queuing of packets in the router buffer, as
illustrated in the detailed figures in the Appendix B.1.
Figure 6.27 and Figure 6.28 show the percentage of average traffic drop in bits
per seconds and packets per seconds, respectively. Similar to the percentage of
maximum instantaneous traffic drop, the average traffic drop in the case of video
application is the lowest. The average traffic drop for the FTP 100KB file size is
more when compared to the 50KB file size, because in the case of the 100KB file size
the frequency of the packet drop is more, as demonstrated in the detailed figures in
Appendix B.1.
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Figure 6.25: Maximum Instantaneous Percentage of Traffic Drop (bps)
Figure 6.26: Maximum Instantaneous Percentage of Traffic Drop (pps)
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Figure 6.27: Percentage of Average Traffic Drop (bps)
6.5 Discussion and Recommendations
In this section, we discuss the suitability of the Internet denial by IISP’s proposed
solution, the performance consideration, and recommendations.
6.5.1 Discussion
In chapter 4, a number of solutions for the Internet denial by IISPs were introduced.
The proposed tunnel-based solution required a low amount of modification to the
network. In the proposed solution, once the tunnel is established, the forwarding
of the packets is done normally through the tunnel, and is valid for both incoming
and outgoing traffic. In terms of performance, the tunnel solution adds an amount
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Figure 6.28: Percentage of Average Traffic Drop (pps)
of overhead traffic due to the addition of a tunnel header to each packet entering
the tunnel. The packet drops can only be examined if the utilization on the links
reaches above 94.91% for TCP traffic and 98.80% for UDP traffic. Furthermore, the
packet drops are only seen in GRE and GRE with check sum tunneling protocols.
6.5.2 Recommendations
Based on the results of the simulations of the tunnel-based solution, we observe that
the IP-in-IP tunneling protocol performs the best. Therefore, it is recommended to
use IP-in-IP tunneling protocol for the deployment because it has the least amount
of overhead when compared with the other tunneling protocols considered in this
thesis. As discussed earlier in section 5.4, the design can be made scalable to account
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for the need to deploy the solution on a large scale.
6.6 Summary
In this chapter, we studied the performance aspects of the tunnel-based solution
by first discussing the simulation setup, then we discussed the aspect of tunnel
fragmentation and its effect on performance. Next, we discussed the results of the
performance evaluation of the proposed tunnel-based solution in terms of end-to-end
delay, tunnel overhead, and packet drop. Lastly, the chapter is concluded by some
discussion and recommendations.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
In this thesis, we discuss the different approaches to overcome the malicious act of
Internet access denial by IISP. The Internet access denial may be intentional as the
case of denial imposed by IISP or unintentional denial as a result of security breach
at the IISP.
The goal of this thesis work is to propose, implement, and validate the solution to
the problem of Internet access denial. In this thesis, only tunnel-based solution is
considered. In addition, the scalability of the design was evaluated for multiple ASes,
and multiple tunnels. Furthermore, a tunnel-based solution design was proposed for
load balancing using a pool of public IP addresses.
For the solution to work, traffic must pass through the tunnel in both directions such
that packets do not get filtered out by the malicious IISP. Thus, the thesis described
the design, implementation, and validation of the tunnel-based approach. Moreover,
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a performance evaluation of tunnel-based solution was provided. The evaluation
was conducted using different tunneling protocols, applications, and traffic loads.
The evaluation used end-to-end delay, tunnel overhead, and packet drop metrics
for comparison. The results of evaluation showed that IP-in-IP tunneling protocol
performed the best among all the protocols considered in this study.
This chapter concludes the thesis by outlining the contributions achieved. Moreover,
it discusses some of the open problems for future work.
7.1 Summary of the Contributions
In this thesis, the following has been achieved:
1. A tunnel-based solution to the Internet denial problem was designed and eval-
uated using OPNET.
2. The network performance was characterized under different tunneling proto-
cols.
3. The scalability of the design was evaluated for multiple ASes, multiple tunnels,
and large number of users.
4. A tunnel-based solution design was proposed for load balancing using a pool
of public IP addresses.
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7.2 Future Work
Many issues in the Internet denial problem are open for further research. Some of
these open issues include:
Detection of Internet denial: The detection process is important to find out
when the traffic blackholing is taking place, and whether the cause of the blackholing
is malicious or non-malicious. The challenge of this process is to distinguish whether
the packet dropping is due to malicious causes such as Denial of Service (DoS) or by
routing level Internet denial, or by non-malicious causes such as mis-configuration of
intermediate routers, congestion in the network, connection time out, and/or server
unavailability.
Dynamic configuration of tunnel establishment: In the proposed solution,
the tunnel is established by manual configuration. One of the open research areas
could be on how to establish a tunnel by dynamic configuration.
Dynamic configuration setup for redistribution: Another open research topic
is related to how redistribution of routing information through the tunnel can be
established dynamically.
Use of Encrypted Tunnels: Since the Provider can analyze traffic inside the
tunnel and, accordingly, drop the packets, then an encryption algorithm can be
used to secure tunneling protocols. Accordingly, performance impacts need to be
revisited and reassessed.
Appendix A
Route Redistribution
Configuration
A.1 Route Redistribution Configuration at RouterR5
The following are the steps for the manual configuration for the route redistribution
in OPNET.
The redistribution configuration on R5 is as follows: Right Click on router R5– Edit
Attributes – IP Routing Protocols – OSPF Parameters – Processes – Process Pa-
rameters – Redistribution – BGP – Redistribution Type – default is set to “EBGP”.
Hence, only EBGP routes are redistributed. We need to change this field to both
IBGP and EBGP. This is shown in Figure A.1.
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Figure A.1: Route Redistribution Configuration at Router R5
Appendix B
OPNET Snapshot for Buffer
Usage and Traffic Drop
B.1 OPNET Snapshot for Buffer Usage and Traf-
fic Drop at Router R5 on Interface IF10
Snapshots from OPNET for the buffer usage and traffic drop are provided in the
following pages. First we examine FTP-50K followed by FTP 100K and Video
conferencing. Each figure is plotted with no tunnel configuration and with tunnel
configuration. The tunnel name is stated in the figure caption.
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Figure B.1: IP Interface Buffer Usage (Bytes) with IP-in-IP Tunnel and with No
Tunnel for FTP 50K file size
Figure B.2: IP Traffic Dropped (Packets) with IP-in-IP Tunnel and with No Tunnel
for FTP 50K file size
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Figure B.3: IP Interface Buffer Usage (Bytes) with GRE Tunnel and with No Tunnel
for FTP 50K file size
Figure B.4: IP Traffic Dropped (Packets) with GRE Tunnel and with No Tunnel
for FTP 50K file size
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Figure B.5: IP Interface Buffer Usage (Bytes) with GRE CS Tunnel and with No
Tunnel for FTP 50K file size
Figure B.6: IP Traffic Dropped (Packets) with GRE CS Tunnel and with No Tunnel
for FTP 50K file size
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Figure B.7: IP Interface Buffer Usage (Bytes) with IP-in-IP Tunnel and with No
Tunnel for FTP 100K file size
Figure B.8: IP Traffic Dropped (Packets) with IP-in-IP Tunnel and with No Tunnel
for FTP 100K file size
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Figure B.9: IP Interface Buffer Usage (Bytes) with GRE Tunnel and with No Tunnel
for FTP 100K file size
Figure B.10: IP Traffic Dropped (Packets) with GRE Tunnel and with No Tunnel
for FTP 100K file size
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Figure B.11: Interface Buffer Usage (Bytes) with GRE CS Tunnel and with No
Tunnel for FTP 100K file size
Figure B.12: IP Traffic Dropped (Packets) with GRE CS Tunnel and with No Tunnel
for FTP 100K file size
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Figure B.13: IP Interface Buffer Usage (Bytes) with IP-in-IP, GRE, and GRE CS
Tunnel and with No Tunnels for Video Conferencing
Figure B.14: IP Traffic Dropped (Packets) with IP-in-IP, GRE, and GRE CS Tunnel
and with No Tunnels for Video Conferencing
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